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INTRODUCTION
In our popular culture and social consciousness, women are no long-
er the second-class citizens they used to be. Magazines, television
* Assistant Professor of Law at Florida International University, M.A. Columbia
University, J.D, LL.M, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article follows from a prior
article, Empowerment or Estrangement? Liberal Feminism's Vision of the 'Progress' of Mus-
lim Women.
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advertisements, and billboards featuring women show us how we have
achieved independence, wealth, desirability, and our intelligence. We are
no longer the supporting role in movies and entertainment but stars in
our own right. For this, we can thank both changing society and the un-
relenting work of many women who refused to bring the coffee for the
boss. The women's movement in the United States has made large gains
for women through the use of social activism and legal action. Their
successes have led to increased acceptance of women in the corridors of
business and government; greater access to education; recognition of the
harms of domestic violence, sexual harassment and rape; and the secur-
ing of reproductive rights. Like the Virginia Slims advertisement used to
say: You've come a long way, baby. Despite these victories, Liberal legal
feminism' has also been critiqued by black feminists and Third World
feminists for its narrow construction of women's rights and its failure to
include women at the margins of Liberal society.2 Its relationship to cul-
1. Throughout this Article, I use a number of terms that require some definition. First,
when I refer to "Liberals," I mean the political and philosophical school of thought that has
among its features a commitment to individual rights, equality (defined often as formal equal-
ity with some acceptance of substantive equality), and the recognition of a public sphere
distinct from a private sphere. Liberal feminism is a branch of this thought that includes gen-
der equality. In some instances, Liberal feminism is a critique of Liberalism's failure to
include women that is based on the argument that women are equal to men, have rights of
citizenship, and ought to be recognized in the public sphere and given equal access to it. Lib-
eral feminism has diverged in that it critiques the private sphere for oppressing women and
hiding a myriad of sins such as domestic violence and inequality in families. Liberal legal
feminism is a subset of broader Liberal feminism and is comprised of legal scholars and activ-
ists who seek to advance Liberal feminist ideas through law reform. Third World feminists,
postcolonial feminists, and Critical Race Feminists often share many ideas with Liberal femi-
nists, however, they distinguish themselves by including specific experiences of race, class,
and colonization into their critiques and diverge from Liberal feminists where the latter fail to
acknowledge these specific histories. Moreover, they are more sympathetic to group rights
than most Liberal feminists.
2. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER
1, 7-16 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003). In her introduction to the volume, Wing
notes that mainstream feminism failed to account for the subordination felt at the intersection
of race and gender as well as for the complicity of dominant women in that subordination:
CRF [Critical Race Feminism] constitutes a race intervention in feminist discourse,
in that it necessarily embraces feminism's emphasis on gender oppression within a
system of patriarchy. But most CRF proponents have not joined the mainstream
feminist movement. While reasons vary, in some cases the refusal to become asso-
ciated is due to that movement's essentialization of all women, which subsumes
variable experiences of women of color under the experience of white middle-class
women. Mainstream feminism has paid insufficient attention to the central role of
white supremacy's subordination of women of color, effectuated by both white men
and women.
Id. at 7; see also Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, in CRITI-
CAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER, supra, 34 (discussing the shortcomings of Catherine
MacKinnon's Dominance Theory for its failure to address race). See generally Kimberle
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tures and religions that are illiberal and non-Western has been fraught
with tension and its track record on fighting for the rights of subordi-
nated women of color both at home and abroad has been inconsistent at
best.
Despite a growing number of critiques of Liberal feminism by Third
World, postcolonial, and Critical Race feminists, the calls for more con-
textual approaches have largely been ignored, particularly in scholarship
on and activism for women in Asia and Africa. Rather, women's experi-
ences in these continents are universalized in ways that erase difference
and context. In the view of most Liberal feminists, women in those parts
of the world are struggling for basic equality and rights. They suffer dai-
ly at the hands of abusive spouses. Their cultural practices continue to
subordinate them and they are at risk of genital "mutilation," dowry
deaths, rape, child marriage, trafficking, forced veiling, and a litany of
other ills.' The Liberal feminist view, in short, sees their lives as univer-
sally abject. Unsurprisingly, women in the United States who have
achieved so much and come such a long way have felt the imperative to
help their sisters around the globe. After all, what woman would elect to
preserve such oppressive religious and cultural structures? What woman
would not want to become educated, independent, and equal like her
Western counterpart? Moreover, what feminist would refuse to help
overcome such oppression and violence?
Beginning in the 1990s and continuing on to the present, transna-
tional activism experienced a growth spurt when many local groups
began to notice the unfortunate circumstances of their sisters in other
countries and then to develop links with groups in those countries to try
to solve the problems related to the oppression of women. Despite these
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) (discussing the intersection of race and gen-
der in the context of violence against women of color).
3. See NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WuDUNN, HALF THE SKY: TURNING OP-
PRESSION INTO OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN WORLDWIDE 3-21 (2009) (highlighting stories of
trafficking, subordination, and humiliation of women in various developing countries and
cultures).
4. By "transnational activism," I mean the work undertaken by individuals and organi-
zations in one country seeking to change or reform policies, practices, and laws in another
country or region. This is different from "international activism" which seeks to change the
laws and policies between states on the international level rather than within specific coun-
tries.
5. See Amy Farrell & Patrice McDermott, Claiming Afghan Women: The Challenge of
Human Rights Discourse for Transnational Feminism, in JUST ADVOCACY?: WOMEN's HUMAN
RIGHTS, TRANSNATIONAL FEMINISMS, AND THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION 33, 46-47
(Wendy S. Hesford & Wendy Kozol eds., 2005) (arguing that international activism around
"barbaric" practices like clitoridectomy and veiling gave U.S. feminists causes to mobilize
their constituents and to gather new members as well as to "legitimate their existence in the
United States within a 'post-feminist' era."); see also Temma Kaplan, Women's Rights as
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good intentions, the idea that women would naturally agree about the
causes of and solutions to their problems collided with concrete differ-
ences. These differences manifested in myriad questions, complicating
the collaborations of transnational activists:' What to do with women
who disagree about what causes their subordination? What to do with
women who disagree that genital cutting is "mutilation?" What to do
with women who refuse to uncover their hair or their faces? What to do
with women who would rather marry as a second wife than not marry at
all? It is easiest perhaps to dismiss these women as victims of false con-
sciousness, brainwashed into believing their subordination is freedom. It
is much harder, however, to view them as articulators of an alternative
view of human flourishing. Although Liberalism has not historically
viewed co-present, alternative visions of human flourishing as equal with
Liberal notions of the good life and good society,' the choice of how to
characterize these women's views is hardly insignificant-rather, it im-
pacts further choices about the way in which we undertake activism on
their behalf or in collaboration with them. Ultimately, this choice may
result in either further compounding their subordination or in fact ena-
bling their flourishing.
This Article examines the ways in which the prioritization of indi-
vidual rights and freedom promoted by Liberal legal feminism,
specifically with regard to family law reform, dictates the reform priori-
ties articulated by transnational activists for women's rights.! As the
Human Rights: Women as Agents of Social Change, in WOMEN, GENDER, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 191 (Marjorie Agosfn ed., 2001) (describing the efforts of
feminist activists since 1990 to raise awareness on a global level of women's rights as a subset
of human rights).
6. See Farrell & McDermott, supra note 5, at 50-52.
7. See UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT 46 (1999). In discussing Liberal theorists' exclusion of
certain groups like Indians from the universalism of Liberalism, Mehta points out that British
Liberal theory deployed a number of strategies to achieve this exclusion. One of these, the
interpretation of cultural particularities and difference as "backwardness," is described as:
[Dielving into the arcane details of ancient theological, cultural, and historical par-
ticulars, and through them, exposing the deficiencies of India's political-although
most often psychological-endowments. It presumes on [sic] the necessity of a
complex set of individual and social indexes as the prerequisite of political inclu-
sion. In this, again, it does not explicitly qualify the universalistic claims; rather, it
implicitly raises the ante and thereby the conditions of inclusion. [This is referred
to] as the strategy of civilizational infantilism.
Id. at 69-70.
Mehta analyzes the work of several Liberal philosophers who have been influential in the
English-speaking world, for example, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham among the utili-
tarians. An interesting counterpoint to these theorists is Edmund Burke, a conservative who
often spoke against the British imperial project in India.
8. See infra notes 10-62 and accompanying text.
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Article explains, this American-born reform package is exported through
international human rights channels, and at transnational meetings
among transnational elites with an aim to reform "local," "traditional"
societies. When these reform priorities arrive at the intended lo-
cal/tradition society, they are met with resistance and alternative
priorities that do not necessarily comport with Liberal feminist agendas.
With this process in mind, the Article traces the journey of key family-
law reforms, namely with regard to reproductive rights and domestic
violence, as these projects move from the United States through the
transnational sphere and into local destinations in South Asia to show
how these core projects are received and reprioritized. Further, the Arti-
cle attempts to uncover the feminist subject that is concurrently
exported. The feminist subject is comprised of a very particular set of
ideas of what it means to be a woman, defining how women should be
and what they should value and prioritize in both law and society. While
the Liberal feminist subject may not necessarily be dangerous or destruc-
tive, this Article questions the ways in which such reforms impact "local
women" themselves and explores the costs of that impact. The Article
proceeds in four Parts. Part I explores the legal reform and activism un-
dertaken by feminists in two key family law areas-the right to abortion
and domestic violence-in order to show how these reforms became
feminist priorities in the United States. Part II explores how these legal
projects are exported into the international and transnational realm
through international human rights law and in the venue of international
meetings. Part III examines the local laws of India, Pakistan, and Bang-
ladesh on reproductive rights and domestic violence and looks at the
reception of transnational reform priorities within a local context, argu-
ing that these priorities are not necessarily congruent with the needs of
local women. Finally, Part IV sets out an alternative set of priorities that
take into consideration the demands of local women in South Asia, con-
cluding that activists should focus on these local priorities rather than
solely on the Liberal feminist agenda.
I. FAMILY LAW AND PROGRESS TOWARD GENDER
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, women have challenged the social and legal
constraints they face in successive generations to win the right to be
treated as equals with men, to have equal access to all public spheres,
and to be recognized as autonomous individuals.9 One of the key
9. See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts,
and Feminism, in FEMINIST SOCIAL THOUGHT: A READER 696, 696-98 (Diana Tietjens
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battlegrounds for change has been the family.'o Family as an institution,
perhaps more than any other, continues to be the most gendered area of
the law, often dictating both public and private gender hierarchies. While
there were a number of projects undertaken to reform family law in the
United States, including marriage and divorce reform, reproductive
rights and domestic violence are two of the most prominent in the last
thirty years."
In this Part of the Article, I explore the domestic roots of the transna-
tional export of family law. The first subsection traces legal reforms in
the area of abortion and domestic violence with two purposes. The first
purpose is to illustrate the roots of a transnational movement toward ex-
porting similar reforms to the Global South. In essence, it lays out what
has transpired in the U.S. domestic arena. The second purpose is to ex-
plore the Liberal feminist subject that is constructed through these
struggles and consequently exported. 2 The two strands of legal reform
and subject construction are intimately woven together and I discuss
them together, showing how the reforms create the feminist subject and
vice versa. Also, in this subsection, I discuss the internal feminist cri-
tiques of these projects that have come from feminist scholars who are
increasingly uncomfortable with feminist orthodoxies and universalisms.
The aim here is to point to the existence of these important disagree-
ments and to raise the question of why these critiques do not also get
exported alongside the reforms, which I take up in subsequent parts of
the Article." The second subsection of this Part discusses the subject of
Meyers ed., 1997) (providing a brief history of gender equality in the American Supreme
Court); see also ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVE-
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES 306 (rev. ed. 1975) (describing the efforts of anti-suffragist
organizations in the late 19th century and early 20th century); Christine A. Littleton, Recon-
structing Sexual Equality, in FEMINIST SOCIAL THOUGHT: A READER, supra, at 714
(discussing the development of different models of feminist legal theory and arguing for a
model of equality as acceptance in which feminine qualities are not a hindrance in the work-
ing world).
10. Family law in nearly every area has changed radically with the advent of the wom-
en's movement and activism by feminist organizations. See STEPHANIE J. COONTZ,
MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: How LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 243, 263-76 (2005) (discussing
the changes in family law and families, particularly with the liberalization of divorce).
11. Family law no longer encompasses simply the law relating to entry into and exit
from marriage and the rearing of children. Casebooks now often start with the very concept of
family. Moreover, most casebooks on the subject include a separate chapter on constitutional
law and the right of privacy, in which reproductive rights play the central role, and a chapter
on domestic violence. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW
(2d ed. 2009); JUDITH AREEN & MILTON C. REGAN, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(5th ed. 2006). Curiously, the economic impact of marriage and divorce is not given a separate
chapter despite its significance in how marital partners fare both in and out of the relationship.
12. See INDERPAL GREWAL, TRANSNATIONAL AMERICA: FEMINISMs, DIASPORAS, NEO-
LIBERALISMS 123 (2005).
13. Grewal notes that:
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the "American Woman" separately. Liberal feminist universalism takes
for granted that all women will eventually be the kind of model rights-
bearing, individual agent that American women represent. This is the
idealized subject that is constructed for export and through it, social
norms, as well as legal ones, are sought to be restructured. It is worth-
while, therefore, to explore the subject specifically.
A. U.S. Liberal Legal Feminist Projects in Family Law
1. Right to Abortion on Demand and Pregnancy
An essential aspect of personal autonomy as understood by Liberal
philosophy is the right to control one's physical being. Women, slaves,
Native Americans, and other colonized groups were historically denied
autonomy and consequently control over their bodies as a matter of law.
The legality of buying and selling a person, of legally sanctioning the
availability of women's bodies because of ownership, of forcing sex on
wives, and of forcing women to bear unwanted children, are all examples
of bodily dependence and subordination tolerated by Liberal philoso-
phy.14 Indeed, the U.S. Constitution, drafted by men deeply rooted in
Liberal thought, reflects the ideals of liberty and equality. Yet, like many
Liberal philosophers, the drafters of the Constitution were able to carve
out certain groups of people from the promises of the Constitution, de-
spite its universal language, because some regarded these groups as
being "naturally" incapable of exercising all of the rights meaningfully. 5
It is against this backdrop of exclusion that women mobilized their ef-
forts and achieved success. By the mid-twentieth century, women were
recognized by society and the state as individuals rather than as append-
ages of their husbands or paternal families. From there, a basis was
formed to press for other rights.
The right to control reproduction came well after the triumph over
ideas such as coverture, women's inability to exercise political judgment,
and their unsuitability to practice law or medicine. It emerged at a time
Articulating a cosmopolitan "global" ethic, human rights crossed many borders. Al-
though, as Gayatri Spivak has pointed out, human rights left out the rural subaltern
and recuperated a colonial relationship with the colonizing West, thus reviving the
notion of "white man's burden," it was difficult to dismiss human rights was simply
an 61ite or neocolonial formation, since they made for a powerful discourse that cir-
culated effectively across many transnational connectivities.
Id.
14. See, e.g., SUAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 25-40 (1989)
(discussing Liberal arguments that justice within families is a misguided goal).
15. See id. at 251-58, 421-28 (discussing blacks and women, respectively).
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of political and social-cultural upheaval and it did not begin as a right to
abortion as it is often characterized in contemporary debates. Rather, the
first right to be sued for in the fight for sexual liberation was the right to
contraception in the line of cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, decided in 1965. The right of women to procure and use
contraception was based on the right to privacy rather than a fundamen-
tal right to equality.6 The privacy in question existed in the marriage,
between two spouses, rather than the individual privacy of the woman. In
Eisenstadt v. Baird, decided in 1972, the Court extended privacy rights to
all women regardless of their marital status, based on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 7 Thus, women were recognized as individuals by their right
to use contraception when they were single. This placed them on more
equal footing with their married counterparts as well as with men who
enjoyed the use of contraceptives regardless of their marital status. Mar-
riage itself began to change from a communal enterprise with the state
being strongly interested in its promotion and protection to a private
agreement between spouses with the state's involvement in the ordering
of the relationship decreasing."
In the 1950s and 1960s, along with the debates about contraception,
there was a renewed interest in abortion. By the 1970s, a number of
states had liberalized their abortion statutes to allow for therapeutic abor-
tion to save either the life of the mother or of the child, or in cases of
16. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
17. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1972).
18. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 72-77 (2nd ed. 1987). Clark notes that
[A]ttitudes toward marriage on the part of some segments of the population are
changing so drastically and publicized so widely and so rapidly that the law can
hardly remain oblivious to them. Attacks upon the institution of marriage are being
made with more or less vehemence by leaders of the women's rights movement on
the ground that it is an instrument by which women are prevented from achieving a
personal identity, or by which they are made the property of men and are enslaved.
Id. at 73 (citing BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 150-81, 233-57 (1963)); KATE
MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITIcs 61-156 (1970).
As evidenced by the increasing acceptance of premarital agreements, now viewed merely
as contracts between spouses, women are arguably stepping fully into their individuality. See
id. at 1-17. See also Richard W. Bartke, Marital Sharing-Why Not Do It By Contract? 67
GEo. L.J. 1131, 1147-64 (1979) (discussing the history and use of private contracts between
spouses providing for the sharing of property). But see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD
A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 61 (1989) ("Feminist theory sees the family as a unit of
male dominance, a locale of male violence and reproductive exploitation, hence a primary
locus of the oppression of women.").
For a historical view of marriage, see, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953),
in which a wife sued her husband for support under the traditional theory that a wife's obedi-
ence was exchanged for financial support. She failed to obtain relief from the court because
she continued to reside with her husband while pursuing the case.
266 [Vol. 32:259
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felonious intercourse resulting in pregnancy.'9 Though there are other
cases in which the Supreme Court had to consider the restrictions on
abortion, the first case in which the right was front and center was Roe v.
Wade.20 Standing on the narrow foothold provided by Griswold, the
Court struck down the Texas statute at issue that prevented women from
procuring an abortion except in situations where medical opinion found
the life of the mother to be in jeopardy.21 The Court held that women had
a constitutional right to privacy that protects the decision to end a preg-
nancy. This fundamental right is "protected by the Bill of Rights or its
penumbras." 22 Further, the Court held that the state's interest in protect-
ing the life of the child does not become compelling until after
viability.23
Having decided that women, as the bearers of children and therefore
the individuals most affected by a pregnancy, have the right to procure
an abortion without undue state interference, the Court was left to deal
with the effects on family relationships that decisions about abortion
might have. These later cases take on the reality that women are not
living in isolation and that others are also intimately bound up in the
decisions made by individuals. For example, in Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Court considered whether anyone
other than the woman in question should be involved in deciding
whether to continue a pregnancy and struck down laws requiring
19. Robin West's analysis of the difference between a married woman's right to abor-
tion and that of a single woman is instructive:
The "marital rape exemption" persisted as formal doctrine well into the 1980s, and
there is still today a substantial lack of parity between the legal treatment of rape in
marriage and rape outside of marriage. Likewise, in 1950 (as well as in the 1960s
and 1970s, up until Roe v. Wade), a married woman impregnated as a result of
forced marital sex-sex forced by violence or threats of violence, but not rape, by
virtue of marital rape exemptions-would not be able to obtain a legal abortion if
she so desired, even when an unmarried woman, pregnant as a result of rape, might
do so. Since a married woman could not be "raped" by her husband, even a pre-Roe
v. Wade "liberal" abortion statute that allowed for abortion in the event of "rape," by
definition, did not extend to married women. Thus-a married woman could be
lawfully forced to conceive and bear children against her will, even where an un-
married woman could not.
ROBIN WEST, MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY AND GENDER 38-39 (2007); see also Robin West, West,
J., Concurring in the Judgment, in WHAT Roe v. Wade SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S
Top LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 121, 124-25
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (describing historical reasons and rights that might explain why a
married woman could not opt for an abortion by herself while an unmarried woman could).
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. Id. at 129 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
22. Id. at 151-55.
23. Id. at 163.
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spousal notification and consent.24 Similarly, in Bellotti v. Baird, the
Court held that statutes preventing minors from obtaining an abortion
without parental notification and consent must include a judicial by-
25pass.
Aside from the legal battles, however, the social debate on abortion
seems to be waning in importance for the majority of Americans. As
Robin West notes, both abortion rights opponents and proponents are
converging on the understanding that the incidence of abortion decreases
26
when women are offered more support for child-bearing and rearing.
But given that so much of feminist theory has been focused on rejecting
arguments based on biological differences between men and women and
on the press for formal equality between men and women, it has been
hard to fashion a theory of pregnancy that supports women and child-
bearing without reopening the door to paternalistic protection of women
by the state. Sylvia Law has theorized this tension between "reality" and
the social interpretations of that reality that both helps and hurts women.
On the one hand, pregnancy cannot form the basis by which to regulate
women to their detriment because such regulations are often based on
impermissible gender role and typing, but, on the other hand, recognition
of the unique position of pregnant women based on the reality that such
women are indeed not akin to men or even non-pregnant women make
legal enactments that benefit only them vulnerable to similar chal-
27
lenges.
Indeed, while feminists have been focused on preventing the erosion
of the right to abortion, they have been less successful with regard to the
treatment of pregnancy and child-care. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to review the literature on the effects of pregnancy and pregnancy
discrimination. However, a few key points are salient to the construction
of the Liberal feminist subject. First, the law constructs pregnancy in a
way that equalizes it with other forms of "illness" or "disability." Women
who become pregnant and want to be paid for maternal leave may cobble
24. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
25. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
26. Interview with Robin West, Frederick J. Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy,
Georgetown University Law Center (June 2008). However, there are still periodic attempts by
states to curb the right to an abortion. For example, Utah enacted a law that would punish
women who "intentionally" miscarry. See Robert Gehrke, Utah Lawmakers Quickly Amend
Much-Criticized Abortion Bill, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 5, 2010, available at http://
www.sltrib.com/news/ci_14519597 (available via subscription).
27. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955,
1014-39 (1984).
28. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 77, 90-98
(2003).
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together sick leave, short-term disability, and vacation time.29 If they are
covered under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), they
may take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for the birth of a child.30 No
employer is required to offer paid maternal leave." Moreover, FMLA is
available for both men and women.
In short, while the law recognizes and attempts to equalize the bur-
den of parenting, it does not do so for pregnancy. Rather, women must
look to benefits that are gender neutral-though ultimately having a
gendered effect-for support during their pregnancy. This is an example
of formal equality at work. While feminists have been pleased with the
protections that the law has afforded in terms of preventing pregnancy
discrimination against women who were previously obliged to leave
work when they began to "show," they have been disappointed and justi-
fiably critical of the lack of public support for child-bearing and
rearing.32 These critiques have come in a number of forms, including the
critique of equality itself. Nevertheless, it seems very difficult if not im-
possible to construct activism around differing notions of equality, such
as substantive equality versus formal equality, when prior activism has
privileged the latter and U.S. equality jurisprudence is largely based on
it.
2. Domestic Violence
Throughout the history of women's rights, Liberal feminists have
struggled with the state, both against its protectionist-patronizing poli-
cies, like protecting women from harm during pregnancy by forcing
them to leave the workforce, unequal labor laws, and statutory rape laws,
and for protection-recognition policies like maternal leave, child care,
rape law, and sexual harassment law, in order to articulate a feminist sub-
ject that is a fully equal citizen. However, the state's continued
reluctance to interfere with the family as a privately ordered institution
has meant that women's equal status in the public sphere sometimes
29. See U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Family and Medical Leave available at
http://www.opm.gov/oca/leave/HTML/fmlafac2.asp (last visited, Oct. 25, 2010). See Preg-
nancy + Short-Term Disability + FMLA.. Very Confused, HUMAN RESOURCEs BLOG (Sept. 3,
2008, 9:02 AM), http://www.humanresourceblog.com/2008/09/03/pregnancy-short-term-
disability-fmla-very-confused/.
30. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2602 (2006).
31. Id. § 2612.
32. See Annie Pelletier, Comment, The Family Medical Leave Act of 1993-Why Does
Parental Leave in the United States Fall so Far Behind Europe?, 42 GoNz. L. REv. 547, 551-
52 (2006); see also Martha T. McCluskey, Caring for Workers, 55 ME. L. REv. 313, 314-16
(2002) (summarizing the debate about public benefits for gendered family caretaking labor).
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stops short at the family home's front door." Behind those doors, tradi-
tional hierarchies and inequalities go unchallenged by state policy and
regulation. Accordingly, the home was and remains another front in the
battle for equality.
Domestic violence has been a perennial concern for women, who are
its chief victims. For feminists, it has been identified as a major block
on the road to equality." The threshold effort engaged in by feminists in
the United States is the very recognition of the existence of a problem. In
a legal milieu where the family itself was deemed to be private and be-
yond the regulation of the state, private actors could commit violence on
family members with relative impunity. Until the nineteenth century,
wife beating, while not socially acceptable when extreme, was nonethe-
less tolerated as a prerogative of the husband." For much of history, the
law allowed husbands to coerce sex from their wives." Even though the
marital rape exemption has been repealed in approximately half the ju-
risdictions in the United States, it remains in effect in the other half."
Even in those jurisdictions in which the exemption is no longer valid,
spousal rape remains a lesser crime than rape committed outside mar-
riage. 9 Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the consent requirement is so
33. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (1953) (showing that there is
no way to enforce a right to support in an existing marriage; rather, only when the marriage
breaks down does a partner's right to support become justiciable); see also Twila L. Perrry,
The "Essentials of Marriage ": Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 1, 14 (2003) (describing the strong belief that judicial intervention into issues of
support before a marriage has dissolved violates principles of marital autonomy).
34. According to a National Institute of Justice Report, women were more likely to
experience intimate partner violence than men. See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181867, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE 17 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/l81867.pdf.
35. See, e.g., State v. Black, 60 N.C. 266, 267 (1864) (holding that the law permits a
husband "to use towards his wife such a degree of force as is necessary to control an unruly
temper and make her behave herself"); see also Das v. Das, 754 A.2d 441, 458-63 (2000)
(outlining the historical toleration for wife-beating and the subsequent change in social con-
sciousness in recognizing that it is a problem).
36. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., SIR MATTHEw HALE, Historia Placitorum Coronae: THE HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628 (Thomas Dogherty ed., new ed. 1800) (1739) ("But the husband
cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband,
which she cannot retract.").
38. See Lalenya Weintraub Seigel, Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to
Extinction, 43 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 351, 367-69 (1995); Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immu-
nity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by
Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1468-1473 (2003).
39. For an overview of current marital rape laws, see generally NAT'L CTR. FOR THE
PROSECUTION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, SUMMARY OF SPOUSAL RAPE LAWS (2009),
www.wcsap.org/pdf/Spousal%20Rape%20Statutes%202009.pdf.
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pitiful that the removal of the exemption seems simply window dress-
40
ing.
Early efforts at reform by feminists were characterized by "the clas-
sic liberal ideology of privacy, autonomy, and individual choice."'
According to Aya Gruber, these efforts were aimed at equalizing domes-
tic rape victims with their non-married counterparts. The problem was
identified as unequal treatment of married women and the under-
enforcement of gender crimes, particularly when they occurred in the
family.42 From the 1960s-1980s, the main feminist project with regard to
domestic violence was, first, to force the state to recognize the crimes
and, second, to punish them. Gruber notes that at a particular moment in
feminist activism related to domestic violence, there was a choice to be
made.43 One choice was to continue the hard work of changing the envi-
ronment in which women lived that gave rise to or exacerbated these
crimes, including activism for economic and distributive justice and oth-
er social reforms-traditional staples of feminist legal theory and
activism. The other choice was to adopt a new approach and engage the
state to pursue and punish the perpetrators." Liberal feminist activism
took the latter road.45
The laws resulting from the marriage of liberal feminist activism and
state power were indeed far more punitive than their predecessors.
Where the state had been a lackadaisical prosecutor of gender crimes, it
then became a ferocious avenger. Two legal reforms that purported to
solve the problem of under-enforcement were mandatory arrest statutes
and "no-drop" policies. The mandatory arrest statutes passed in many ju-
risdictions resulted in the ballooning of the number of domestic violence
arrests being made. By forcing the police officers called to a domestic dis-
pute to take the situation seriously by mandating arrest, police officers'
40. Id.
41. Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship on Rape: A Maturing Look at One
Form of Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35, 38 (1995).
42. Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IowA L. REV. 741, 752-63 (2007); see
also, Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 16 (1999)
(illustrating the more widespread prosecution of domestic violence crimes in recent years).
43. See Gruber, supra note 42, at 762 (describing this moment of choice between "ag-
gressive prosecution" and "feminist adherence to a woman's autonomy," which meant
respecting women's choices not to seek prosecution). See also Donna Coker, Crime Control
and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Lw, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 806-07
(2001) (discussing the dilemma of mandatory prosecution policies encroaching on individual
female autonomy). Naomi Cahn has similarly observed that the state's approach has not been
particularly sensitive to women. Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the
Dilemmas of Criminalization, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 820-22 (2000).
44. See Gruber, supra note 42.
45. Id. at 762-63.
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discretion was essentially taken away from them.4 Writing for The Wash-
ington Post, Liza Mundy highlights the absurd results sometimes
achieved by these policies. She describes a domestic dispute in which
the wife "pushed" her husband, resulting in a call to the police and a
mandatory arrest of the wife. 47 Regarding these new laws mandating ar-
rest, Mundy observes that "the new approach represents a huge change,
both practically and philosophically-and a huge victory for advocates
on behalf of domestic violence victims."4
Another victory for Liberal feminist activism is the implementation
of no-drop policies, which are a corollary to the mandatory arrest re-
gime. These policies attempt to ensure that domestic violence cases will
be treated as serious crimes from arrest through prosecution by requiring
prosecutors "to pursue any case where there is sufficient evidence."49
That is to say, the prosecutor may not drop the case and the victim does
not have a choice about whether he or she will go through with the pros-
ecution.o With the state at the helm rather than the victim, prosecution
46. See G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence,
and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237, 240-41
(2005).
47. Liza Mundy, Fault Line, WASH. POST MAG., Oct. 26, 1997 at 8, 8-10. The article is
worth quoting at length:
"Is this the Gestapo or what?" Tom says. "I just wanted documentation in a custody
dispute. I certainly didn't want this!"
Tucker puts Judy in the back of his squad car and drives her to the Fairfax County
Adult Detention Center, where she is charged with domestic assault and battery un-
der Virginia's criminal code, section 18.2-57.2. The new law directs Tucker to
request an emergency protective order to protect Tom from further acts of abuse,
and so Tucker does, and the order is granted, directing Judy to stay away from her
husband-specifically, his office-for three days, except for "incidental contact to
assure welfare of children."
A $750 bond is set to guarantee she shows up for trial.
Her name is entered into the Virginia crime information network, so that if she vio-
lates the stay-away order, her existing criminal charge will be readily available.
She is fingerprinted and her mug shot is taken....
Meanwhile, back at the office complex, the two remaining officers, T.J. Rogers and
Ben Ferdinand try to calm her husband-counseling the victim, as the new law also
directs. We don't have discretion, Ferdinand explains, gently, for the third time.
"You're not pressing charges. It's Officer Tucker who's pressing charges . . .
Id. at 10.
48. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
49. Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 7, 16
(2004) (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 17. Goodmark describes the difference between "hard" and "soft" no-drop
policies:
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statistics for domestic violence showed a marked increase, incarceration
rates for perpetrators similarly increased, domestic homicide rates
dropped, and violence in general dropped.'
Yet as Goodmark, Gruber, and Miccio note, there is a dark side to
these "improvements."52 While feminists protested vociferously about
under-enforcement of gender crimes in the bad old days, when those
crimes were finally taken seriously, the manner in which the state under-
took reform gave some feminists further reason to complain. The
policies and reforms that were enacted turned out to be blunt instruments
with none of the nuanced approach that a crime committed by one in-
timate partner against another who is closely connected and possibly
dependent deserves. Goodmark underscores a number of problems,
including the disparate impact of mandatory arrest and no-drop policies
on minority families." Gruber treats the deprivation of agency suffered
by women at length and notes that this was a consequence-perhaps
unintentional and certainly unfortunate-of doing business with the
state.5 4 MiCCio's critique rests more on the inefficacy of these strategies
in actually dealing with the domestic violence problem." As she notes,
zero-tolerance did not lead to a slow eradication of domestic violence
as was hoped for, but rather pushed the problem into the shadows
where victims, now afraid of the consequences of state intervention,
continue to be abused by their partners." The problem for them is not
primarily legal but cultural:
Prosecutors' offices employ either "hard" or "soft" no-drop policies. Hard no-drop
jurisdictions push cases forward regardless of the victim's wishes. In these jurisdic-
tions, if the victim's testimony is deemed essential, prosecutors will even subpoena
reluctant victims to testify and arrest or request imprisonment of victims who refuse
to appear pursuant to the subpoena. Victims in hard no-drop jurisdictions are also
expected to participate extensively in pre-trial preparation, signing statements, be-
ing photographed and interviewed, and providing the state with information. In soft
no-drop jurisdictions, which are thought to be more prevalent, victims are not
forced to testify in criminal matters but are provided with services designed to in-
crease comfort with the criminal system and are encouraged to cooperate. In cases
where the victim will not testify despite receiving these services, and the case can-
not be made without her, prosecutors are likely to dismiss charges despite the no-
drop policy.
Id. at 17.
51. See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of
Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 1657, 1671-74 (2004).
52. See Goodmark, supra note 49; Gruber, supra note 42; Miccio, supra note 46.
53. Goodmark, supra note 49, at 35-39.
54. See generally Gruber, supra note 42, at 811-13.
55. See Miccio, supra note 46, at 323.
56. See id. at 280-82.
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Criminalization, as envisioned by advocates in the 1970s and
1980s, was strategic. The institution of mandatory practices,
specifically arrest, was perceived as the first step in a process
that would lead to a seismic cultural change by inscribing wom-
en's empowerment, individual and collective accountability, and
conceptions of equality upon the cultural landscape.
This is an interesting departure from other critics of these policies in
that Miccio seeks to re-center the cultural and societal acceptance of
female subordination in the United States much in the way that inter- and
trans-nationalists seek to center it in the global fight against domestic
violence. That is to say, culture is often the explanation for domestic
violence and women's subordination in the Global South, but much less so
in the U.S. context. Miccio's recognition of the cultural component of
domestic violence and the explicitly cultural impact that the legal reforms
hoped to make adds a dimension missing from other critiques. Yet, Miccio
also notes that the reforms did not work a seismic change in culture." As
the decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez emphasized, the state's
willingness to protect women even after the enactment of these
antidiscretionary policies was less than robust."
In sum, while liberal feminist activists did not abandon the broader
goals of gender justice, many were willing to take a chance on the possi-
bility that the state would take seriously violence done to women if their
discretion not to was removed. In some sense, then, mandatory arrest and
no-drop policies were met with a feeling of hope and gratification by pro-
ponents of mandatory policies." Characterizing women as victims,
suffering first at the hands of the abuser and then at the hands of a patriar-
chal state, it is easy to see the attraction of using the state's power-now
cast in the light of women's rights champions-to hit back at abusers.
The changes in women's legal rights in the United States reflect the
57. Id. at 265.
58. Id. (discussing how mandatory practices were expected to work a "seismic cultural
change by inscribing women's empowerment, individual and collective accountability, and
conceptions of equality upon the cultural landscape," and showing how this did not happen).
59. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 748 (2005) (holding that Gonzalez
had no protected due process property interest in the enforcement of a restraining order
against her husband, and, as such, the police did not violate her constitutional rights. Gonsales
repeatedly called the police after her estranged husband kidnapped her three children. The
police failed to intervene and the husband subsequently murdered the children). See also G.
Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and Conceptions
of State Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111 (2005) (examining the Public Duty Doctrine that
shields the state from tort claims arising from their failure to protect against domestic vio-
lence).
60. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAK-
ING 186 (2000).
61. See Gruber, supra note 42, at 759, 825.
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evolving nature of women's personhood and the way in which law con-
ceives of women as subjects and citizens. As the next Section discusses,
those changes form the foundations of the Universal Woman or feminist
subject constructed by Liberal feminism.
B. American Woman: The Subject of Export
As feminist reforms in family law were undertaken, a number of
theoretical issues emerged. One of these, the tension between commu-
nity and individuality, was a result of the change in family structure and
hierarchy that came about as the family itself transformed from a com-
munitarian, status oriented institution into a partnership of equals or a
contractual arrangement. As women strove to achieve equality, they also
became more fully individuated both outside and within the family.62 The
view was that men had always enjoyed the unencumbered legal and po-
litical identity imagined by liberal theory. Women, however, were placed
at the mercy of their biology and the attachments of family that it en-
tailed.6' As a matter of fairness then, a threshold struggle was to achieve
the kind of individuality that would make women equal to that of men in
the eyes of the law and society and that would afford the kinds of oppor-
tunities outside the home that men enjoyed.6 As Mary Becker notes:
Liberal feminism assumes that people are autonomous individu-
als making decisions in their own self-interest in light of their
individual preferences. Human well-being therefore should in-
crease as individuals have more choices. Sexism operates by
pressuring of requiring, sometimes by law, individuals to fulfill
male and female roles regardless of their individual preferences.
The solution to inequality between women and men is to offer
individuals the same choices regardless of sex. The legal stan-
dard of formal equality is an expression of this solution.
While such individuation has certainly brought many benefits to
women, including the ability to make choices that were heretofore
62. See Reva B. Seigel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 818-22 (2007). Seigal
argues that vesting women with the right to choose motherhood "recognizes women as self-
governing agents who are competent to make decisions for themselves and their families" and
that "reproductive rights repudiate customary assumptions about women's agency and wom-
en's roles." Id. at 819.
63. Id.
64. See Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism,
1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 32-33 (1999).
65. Id. The problem with this approach is that if the realm of choices is constrained to
those that reflect a particular social ordering, then the "real" choice that women or men may
wish to make may not be a viable option.
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foreclosed to them, there has been much critique of equality in recent
feminist scholarship. However, many of the critiques, rooted from
within the overarching Liberal perspective, continue to take for granted,
in some sense, the underlying Liberal theories of personhood, the role of
the person in society, the rights of a person in the state, the changing na-
ture of family, a belief in Aristotelian notions of equality, and a
privileging of positive law imbedded in the state itself.67 As Eva Feder
Kittay notes,"[t]he view that within a just society all persons should be
treated as free and equal is shared by different theories within the liberal
tradition. The inclusiveness of the all has been extended to the formerly
disenfranchised, for example, women and black men."
Yet, despite the inclusion of women, a considerable tension contin-
ues to color women's rights debates. Women, as caregivers to dependent
children or elders, are often not able to make the autonomous choices
that Liberal personhood envisions.69 Kittay and others have attempted to
reconcile or balance the reality of the communal nature of many wom-
en's lives with this atomistic individual agent-subject."o Kittay attempts
to provide a dependency critique of Liberalism in which she argues that
traditional theory has not accounted for the times in life when a human is
entirely dependent on another for survival." Because of this, Liberal the-
ory is under-inclusive of women who are the primary caregivers
constrained in their choices by the duties and obligations of care.72 in
other words, the hierarchy of actors within the traditional Liberal theo-
retical order does not comport with the lived experience of women who
often subordinate their individual "rights" and preferences so that others
who are dependent on them might flourish. This is not to say that women
would be better off giving up their individual legal identities. Such an
idea frames the problems and the tension in a false dichotomy where
66. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF
IDENTITY AND EMPIRE 59-77 (2006); Lisa Schwartzman, Liberal Rights Theory and Social
Inequality: A Feminist Critique, HYPATIA, Spring 1999, at 26, 27-30. See also EVA FEDER
KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY 75-76 (1999)
(highlighting the neglect of dependency and the consequences of that omission in theories of
equality and social justice).
67. See, e.g., Robin West, Review Essay, Liberalism and Abortion, 87 GEo. L.J. 2117
(1999) (placing the work of Eileen McDonagh on the Liberal continuum from J.S. Mill to
Catherine MacKinnon, extending freedom in marriage, in sexual choice, and finally in child-
bearing).
68. See KITTAY, supra note 66, at 75.
69. See id. at 76.
70. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CA-
PABILITIEs APPROACH 174-186, 230-240 (discussing the tension between women's individual
rights and their belonging in religious communities).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 77.
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women are forced to choose between all or nothing.73 Yet, resolving the
tension and balancing the individual rights framework with lived com-
munitarian experience has been extremely difficult.
Another problem that has emerged within liberal feminist activism is
the continued stereotyping of women in the law as a vulnerable group
requiring protection.74 Such rhetoric is commonplace in the realm of do-
mestic violence but it has also been deployed in reproductive rights to
limit the choices women may make. It is understandable that feminist
activists prefer not to focus on difference when that difference is used to
diminish women's autonomy and freedom. Indeed, the autonomy that
has been so hard won is of prime importance to American women (and
all other women as well) as they struggle to gain equal access. Legal at-
tempts to paternalistically protect women from having to make hard
choices has been resisted even while women's autonomy is sometimes
used punitively in a "you've made your bed, now lie in it" sort of man-
76
ner.
Given the willingness of the law to use autonomy against women
while attempting to diminish the same through "protectionism" explains
why American women have clung to it. Indeed, despite prodigious gains
in legal rights and access to the public sphere, American women con-
tinue to face many of the challenges faced by women globally. They
continue to be underrepresented in terms of political power and as lead-
ers of private industry, and they continue to face obstacles to their
advancement in almost every field due to lagging support from the
state.7 Furthermore, violence against women continues to be a perennial
problem. In addition to this, as autonomous agents and independent pub-
lic subjects, American women have become a considerable economic
market toward which commercial industries target particular kinds of
products and services." In the social sphere, women are considered
73. Another way of understanding this false dichotomy is as the agent/object dichot-
omy or the autonomy/dependency dichotomy. On one side is inscribed the idealized individual
who in Greek philosophy would have been capable of citizenship and political life while on
the other is someone who is incapable of citizenship or public existence because of their de-
pendent and objectified nature. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 28-37 (2d ed.
1998).
74. See Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and Culpability in
Reproductive Health Jurispndence, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 136-46 (2010) (discussing the
use of culpability as a tool to punish women for certain reproductive choices).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See MAcKINNON, supra note 18, at 155-70.
78. See BROWN, supra note 66, at 189; see also Rebecca Reisner & Derek Thompson,
The Diet Industry: A Big Fat Lie, BUSINESsWEEK (2008), http://www.businessweek.com/
debateroonarchives/2008/01/thedietindust.html ("Americans spend $40 billion a year on
weight-loss programs and products."); see also Pallavi Gogol, Special Report, I am Woman,
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equal, capable, and free, but their choices are shaped by subtler and more
insidious forces than those which women in the Global South face. This
subtle sexist coercion is under-theorized, poorly understood, and often
rejected by women themselves who prefer the illusion of their own pow-
er of choice. 9
Other critiques from alternative strands of feminism include differ-
ence, dominance, and diversity critiques, all of which argue that women
are underserved by theories of equality for similar overlapping reasons."o
More recently, an emerging critical neo-feminist legal theory is question-
ing some of the orthodoxies of the past two decades." It is interesting to
note, then, that these rich disagreements within U.S. feminist legal the-
ory are flattened when they are packaged for export. That is to say,
feminist activists tend not to include such critical perspectives when they
undertake activism for reform in the Global South. Rather, mainstream
Liberal legal feminism, with its attachments to formal equality and the
individual agent, seems to be the unquestioned export. Indeed, like Lib-
eral notions of universal rights, feminism has its own orthodox views on
1 2
women's universal rights.
To some extent this can be explained by Liberal feminism and Lib-
eralism's shared conception of progress. If feminist legal theory
conceives of formal equality as the first battle in the gender war for in-
clusion, then Liberal notions of progress that place all societies on a
historical continuum would suggest that "backward" societies must fight
this battle as well. This in turn suggests particular kinds of formal, posi-
tivist reform measured by state actions and interventions toward
regulating a state's population and ensuring equal protection for women.
Yet, how well these ideas travel, particularly to societies that continue to
understand humans as primarily relational and communal beings, re-
Hear Me Shop, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/
bwdaily/dnflash/feb2005/nf2005O2l4-9413_db 082.htm; William Saletan, Tuck Off: The
Healthy Recession in Cosmetic Surgery, SLATE (Apr. 8, 2008, 7:52 AM), http://
www.slate.com/id/2188419/ (discussing the popularity of breast implants and other cosmetic
procedures).
79. See BROWN, supra note 66, at 189.
80. See generally Wing, supra note 2; IDENTITY POLITICS AND WOMEN: CULTURAL
REASSERTIONS AND FEMINISMS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Valentine M. Moghadam
ed., 1994).
81. Professors Aya Gruber, Cyra Choudhury, Laura Kessler, and Leigh Goodmark led a
workshop at the Third Annual Feminist Legal Theory and Practice Conference at the Univer-
sity of Baltimore's School of Law. For conference details, see Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of L.,
2010 Feminist Legal Theory Conference, http://law.ubalt.edultemplate.cfm?page=1374 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010).
82. See Cyra Akila Choudhury, Empowerment or Estrangement?: Liberal Feminism's
Visions of the "Progress" of Muslim Women, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 153, 156-59 (2009).
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mains a question to be settled and is taken up in more detail later in the
Article.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS VEHICLE
A. Exporting Progress
While feminist organizations in the United States continued the bat-
tle for gender equality, a simultaneous movement emerged in the 1990s
that took up the cause of women in the far reaches of the world.83 This
second flank of activism can be distinguished into two forms: transna-
tional projects and international projects. For the purpose of this Article,
transnational projects are those that require partner organizations in the
home country and seek to reform laws in the domestic sphere through
local activism as well as assistance from external organizations. Interna-
tional projects are those that seek to reform or enforce international laws
such as U.N. conventions and treaties. As can be readily discerned, these
two types of projects may be intimately connected, overlapping, and co-
developing, thus yielding a third hybrid project type. The discussion in
this Section considers hybrid transnational projects that seek to reform
national law and specific local norms based on and justified by interna-
tional law and that also seek to have an impact on the construction and
interpretation of international law. This Section specifically considers the
structural and normative means that Liberal legal feminism uses to effect
change in the Global South.M In its conclusion, this Section argues that
Liberal feminist organizations in the United States base their reform
agendas on their own experience. This explanation accounts for the
83. See Farrell & McDermott, supra note 5, at 46-47.
84. SUSAN DELLER Ross, WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTERNATIONAL AND COM-
PARATIVE LAW CASEBOOK 1 (2008):
Throughout human history women have faced discrimination and violence and, de-
spite significant progress, still do. But today, it is possible to help change that
reality through the international human rights system that arose from the ashes of
World War H. Lawyers can use international treaties and lessons from comparative
law to create new domestic legal structures to advance women's rights in every
country around the globe. To do so, they must understand the interlocked elements
of women's subordination and the ways that law can be used either to deny or grant
women equality and freedom from violence.
Id. (emphasis added).
It is of interest that although Ross claims that countries can learn from each other
through comparative law, her use of the methodology highlights the problems in the Global
South. The normative valence of human rights, given here as a neutral law, are well hidden.
One might ask that, if it were discovered that polygamy or veiling had some social benefits for
women, would the author advocate it in a Western context? Clearly the conclusion is so well
foregone that the question itself seems ridiculous.
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continuities between the U.S. domestic priorities and those found in the
international-transnational space. Evidence of this approach can be seen
in the materials of a number of leading transnational organizations based
in the United States. For instance, the Feminist Majority Foundation
(FMF), a leading Liberal women's rights group, takes on particular is-
sues that impact women globally." Yet, the way in which these issues are
framed and the "problems" identified may not be in accord with women
who are purportedly beset by them. The International Women's Rights
Action Watch is specifically dedicated to promoting recognition of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW)." Stop Violence Against Women provides training
materials including methods on improving law enforcement and judicial
responses." The Center for Reproductive Rights provides reporting on
reproductive rights and lobbies the U.S. government to pressure states to
comply with international law. 9 These organizations base their strategies
on domestic views of the issues and use international law to promote
their agenda. For example, FMF states:
85. Global Women's Rights, FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUNDATION, http://feminist.org/
globallindex.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
86. For instance, the Feminist Majority Foundation is committed to eradicating vio-
lence against women. One form of violence that it has identified is female genital cutting,
which it terms "mutilation." Examining the sources of their information, they list the World
Health Organization, the United Nations, the U.S. Department of State, Amnesty International,
and BBC News. Not one of these sources is located in the country where they are seeking to
eradicate the practice. Violence Against Women: Female Genital Mutilation, FEMINIST MAJOR-
ITY FOUNDATION, http://feminist.org/global/fgm.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
87. Women Change the World, INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTION WATCH,
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iwraw/about.html (last visited Oct. 25,2010):
The IWRAW program pioneered shadow reporting (NGO participation in the re-
view of a country that has ratified a treaty) for the CEDAW Convention and shadow
reporting on women's human rights to the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. In addition to producing shadow reports for sixty country reviews
and holding international consultations on topics related specifically to the CEDAW
Convention, IWRAW has engaged in training, conferences and expert groups, and
global events such as the Fourth World Conference on Women and its follow-up re-
views, all with a view to expanding the knowledge and application of the CEDAW
Convention and other human rights treaties to advance women's human rights.
Id.
Itis interesting to note here that the organization is based in the U.S.-a country that has
not yet ratified Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women
(CEDAW) itself.
88. Domestic Violence Training Modules, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://
stopvaw.org/DomesticViolenceTraining-Modules.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
89. Engaging Policymakers: Around the World, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS,
http://reproductiverights.org/en/our-worklengaging-policymakers/around-the-world (last vis-
ited Oct. 25, 2010).
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The Feminist Majority Foundation's Global Campaign has al-
ways been based on the belief that the fight we face on the
domestic front and the fight we face on the global front for
women's rights are not two separate battles: They are one and
the same. Women's rights are human rights.90
It should be noted, however, that the United States is not the sole ex-
porter of Liberal feminist reforms or subjects. Moreover, the
epistemological traffic is not one-way. As I show below, there is a great
deal of interaction and cross-pollination in the framing of the problems
and their solutions, primarily in the context of the Global South. How-
ever, knowledge and subjectivities constructed in South Asia that might
benefit women in the United States are not readily imported into and
given effect in the West, which inhabits a position of already having
achieved "human rights" and having nothing to learn from women in the
Global South.9' Indeed, domestic problems in the United States and Eu-
rope are rarely spoken of in terms of international human rights
problems.
The first subsection maps the international laws that are available for
securing women's rights to abortion and protecting women against vio-
lence in order to highlight the continuities in the discourse about
international law and U.S. domestic law.92 It then examines two interna-
tional meetings as examples of the transnational space in which the
exchange of ideas and the crafting of strategies for rights activism takes
place. This helps to trace the transnational feminist subject that emerges
from the interactions of elite women at these transnational meetings.
The second subsection examines the subject that emerges. It traces
the continuities between the American Woman and the Universal Wom-
an, arguing that the very meaning and content of what it is to be a
woman is derived from Liberalism. This hegemonic construction then
works to exclude other ways of being a woman in the same moment that
it seeks to improve women's lives through reform.
90. FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUNDATION, supra note 85.
91. For instance, India recently passed a bill reserving a third of the seats in parliament
for women. India has often used quotas to redistribute power to underrepresented groups.
Although it is a controversial move, it has succeeded. See Harmeet Shah Singh, India's Upper
House Passes Pro-Women Bill, CNN (March 10, 2010, 1:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com
2010/WORLD/asiapcf/03/10/india.women.bill/index.html. But it is unimaginable that such a
reform would take place in the United States with its traditional abhorrence of anything re-
motely resembling a "quota." See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) (invalidating quotas as a violation of equal protection).
92. I note here that I am not examining the ways in which activist organizations in the
Global South access international law to justify their positions. Rather, I am following the
routes mostly in one direction. A study of the dialogic way in which women's rights in the
South are constructed is a next step in the broader field.
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1. International Laws: Abortion Rights and Domestic
Violence Prevention as Universals
Although women's rights scholarship has increased exponentially in
the last three decades, the number of formal, binding international legal
instruments available as the framework for recognition of women's
rights remains limited" On the other hand, a large number of statements,
declarations, resolutions, and reports from a plethora of sources continue
to add to the literature and form a secondary layer of material to which
activists and scholars look for emerging consensus or trends.94
The main international instruments95 that women can use, aside from
the United Nations Charter itself, are: 1) the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) ;96 2) the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR);' 3) the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);98 and 4) the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 99 Though
the UDHR is a declaration, and thus non-binding, the ICCPR, ICESCR,
and CEDAW are treaties and, as such, have the force of justiciable law.10
93. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, When Globalization Hits Home: International Family Law
Comes ofAge, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1551, 1572-1580 (2006).
94. See infra notes 104 and 205; see, e.g., infra note 120.
95. See infra Table 1.
96. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/217(IH) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR], available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
UDHR/Pages/Introduction.aspx.
97. International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter
ICCPR], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm.
98. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter
ICESCRI, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm.
99. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) [herein-
after CEDAW], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/convention.htm.
100. The UDHR is undoubtedly the most significant statement of the rights due to a
person by nature of his or her humanity and nothing else. It has been the work of feminist
activists to constantly and consistently remind the world's leaders and its populace that the
document applies with equal force to women as it does to men. The entire declaration is of
relevance to women, of course, but there are Articles that are specifically useful for activism
on behalf of women's rights. Table 1 provides a comprehensive list of these Articles. The
UDHR is a neutral law that enshrines the liberal aspiration in Article 2 that every human will
be treated equally irrespective of his or her "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status." It exhorts states to
treat their subjects as equal before the law. For women in particular, the UDHR recognizes the
right to marry and establish a family. Moreover, each party to a marriage is entitled to equal
rights at every stage of the relationship including dissolution. Article 25(2) accords mother-
hood and childhood "special care and assistance." In terms of security of the person and
provisions against violence to the person, the UDHR has far more substance. Articles 2
through 8 provide that the life and liberty of all shall be protected, that all persons will be free
from torture, cruel, and inhuman or degrading punishment, and that they shall be equal before
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In addition to these sources, statements that have been made by other
international bodies, like the U.N. General Assembly and the Human
Rights Committee, might have some force, at least in indicating an in-
creasingly accepted norm of international law even though they are not
binding on any state.'0 '
Of these instruments, only CEDAW specifically deals with women
and is truly global in its scope. Yet, it is also hampered by reservations
made by signatory states that are free to limit obligations to the extent
that they are incompatible with religion or culture.'m The UDHR, more-
over, enshrines the right to life in a manner that has left it vulnerable to
interpretation by abortion opponents who argue that a fetus is included
in "everyone" and, therefore, abortion would be a violation of the Decla-
ration.0o As such, it is safe to say that there really is no single
the law with a right to an effective remedy for breaches of their rights. Article 12 is of particu-
lar interest because it provides that persons shall be free from attacks on their honor (an
"honor-killing" arguably is an attack on both a woman's person and her honor). Article 28
provides an international system where such rights will be actualized (arguably preventing
violence between states which deprives human beings of their human rights).
The UDHR was the product of a growing consciousness that states ought not to be left
unrestrained to treat their own subjects with impunity. As such, it is directed at states to pre-
vent the kind of genocidal violence that occurred during the Second World War. Interestingly,
it was not particularly a response to another kind of violence that had been done over centuries
to millions of people on almost every continent: that is to say, it was not a response to coloni-
zation. Nevertheless, despite its parochial birth, the UDHR was widely adopted and the claim
continues to be that the rights that it enshrines are "universal"-applicable across culture,
religion, economic status, gender, and any other axis of difference. Increasingly in the last few
decades, the UDHR has also been used against states for allowing private acts breaching the
human rights of people. For feminist activists, gender-neutral laws such as the UDHR offer an
avenue by which they can communicate that women are important and that violations of
women's rights are abrogations of international commitments entered into by signatory states
whether the acts are done by the states themselves or are countenanced and given protection
by the states because they do not enforce the rights or prosecute the violation when such viola-
tions are done by private actors. See UDHR, supra note 96. See, e.g., Renu Mandhane, The
Use of Human Rights Discourse to Secure Women's Interests: Critical Analysis of the Implica-
tions, 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275 (2004) (arguing that, while human rights imply women's
rights, international organizations may need to explicitly reference women's rights in some
contexts in order to promote women's interests); see also Johanna E. Bond, International
Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women's International Human
Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71 (2003) (discussing the need to understand the identities of
women as being shaped by additional factors such as race, nationality, and religion in order to
promote women's rights).
101. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 96.
102. See, Ross, supra note 84, at 13; see also Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Ap-
proaches to International Iaw, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613,633 (1991).
103. This is an odd interpretation given that the declaration clearly speaks of the rights
attaching to born humans. Arguably, the UDHR is inapplicable to those yet to be born. See
UDHR, supra note 96, art. 3; see also Peta-Gaye Miller, Member State Sovereignty and Women's
Reproductive Rights: The European Union's Response, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 195,
200-04 (1999); Donald A. MacLean, Note, Can the EC Kill the Irish Unborn?: An Investigation
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international treaty or convention that is accepted universally and pro-
tects women's right to reproductive choice, let alone abortion
specifically. However, proponents of the recognition of such a right cob-
ble together the provisions of the UDHR, CEDAW, ICCPR, and
ICESCR to arrive at a rough approximation of legal support for the right.
Zampas and Gher, counsel for the Center for Reproductive Rights,
outline these provisions.'M According to them, the ICCPR's Article 6(1)
provides that the right to life ought not be read restrictively.os Given the
number of women who die or are seriously injured from unsafe abor-
tions, a state's failure to provide safe abortion can be a violation of
Article 6(1). The Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 28
has interpreted Article 6(1) in this expansive manner and requires states
to take measures to prevent unwanted pregnancies and clandestine abor-
tion.'" Further, criminalization of abortion, even in cases of rape, was of
"particular concern" for the Committee.'07 In its 2004 Concluding Obser-
vations to Poland, the Human Rights Committee stated that the threat of
criminal sanctions "incite[s] women to seek unsafe, illegal abortions,
with attendant risks to their life and health." 08
CEDAW links women's right to health with access to abortion and a
requirement that states work toward decreasing the number of maternal
deaths due to back alley abortions.'"9 As Zampas and Gher note, "with
respect to abortion, CEDAW has given considerable attention to the issue
of maternal mortality as a result of unsafe abortions, and explicitly
framed the issue as a violation of women's right to life.,,o Interestingly,
the connection between the lack of access to family planning services,
the methods, and the illegality of abortions are all cited as causal factors
of unsafe abortions and resulting maternal deaths.''
of the European Community's Ability to Impinge on the Moral Sovereignty of Member States,
28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 527 (1999).
104. Christina Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right-International
and Regional Standards, 8 HUM. RTs. L. REv. 249, 256-58 (2008).
105. Id. at 256.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 257.
108. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Cove-
nant, Human Rights Comm., 82d Sess., Oct. 27-Oct. 28, 2004, 8, CCPR/CO/82/POL (Dec.
2, 2004).
109. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommen-
dations Adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention, in COMPILATION OF GENERAL
COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES
233, 280 (2004), transmitted by Note of the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.7 (May
12, 2004).
110. See Zampas & Gher, supra note 104, at 258-59.
111. Id. at 259.
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Finally, the ICESCR gives issues surrounding the family significant
importance. Articles 10 and 12 in particular require the state to protect
the family and to provide adequate healthcare.'1 2 These can be read to
place an affirmative duty on the states to protect maternal health includ-
ing the right to abortion, at the very least in order to protect the life of
the mother."' Given that a significant number of countries in the world
have a blanket ban on abortion, such a reading would certainly mean that
those countries are in violation of their human rights obligations. 4
112. See ICESCR, supra note 98.
113. See, e.g., Zampas & Gher, supra note 104, at 259.
114. Although it is not legally binding, the Beijing Platform of Action outlines the aspi-
ration of various women's movements with regard to reproductive rights. In that agenda, the
conference outlined the importance of reproductive choice and health. Reproductive health is
broadly defined to include a safe and satisfying sex life, the freedom to choose when and how
often to bear children, and the right of access to health care. It goes on to note:
Reproductive health eludes many of the world's people because of such factors as:
inadequate levels of knowledge about human sexuality and inappropriate or poor-
quality reproductive health information and services; the prevalence of high-risk
sexual behaviour; discriminatory social practices; negative attitudes towards women
and girls; and the limited power many women and girls have over their sexual and
reproductive lives. Adolescents are particularly vulnerable because of their lack of
information and access to relevant services in most countries. Older women and
men have distinct reproductive and sexual health issues which are often inade-
quately addressed.
The human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide
freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and re-
productive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Equal relationships
between women and men in matters of sexual relations and reproduction, including
full respect for the integrity of the person, require mutual respect, consent and
shared responsibility for sexual behaviour and its consequences.
Further, women are subject to particular health risks due to inadequate responsive-
ness and lack of services to meet health needs related to sexuality and reproduction.
Complications related to pregnancy and childbirth are among the leading causes of
mortality and morbidity of women of reproductive age in many parts of the devel-
oping world. Similar problems exist to a certain degree in some countries with
economies in transition. Unsafe abortions threaten the lives of a large number of
women, representing a grave public health problem as it is primarily the poorest
and youngest who take the highest risk. Most of these deaths, health problems and
injuries are preventable through improved access to adequate health-care services,
including safe and effective family planning methods and emergency obstetric care,
recognizing the right of women and men to be informed and to have access to safe,
effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice, as
well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which are not against
the law, and the right of access to appropriate health-care services that will enable
women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth and provide couples with the
best chance of having a healthy infant. These problems and means should be ad-
dressed on the basis of the report of the International Conference on Population
and Development, with particular reference to relevant paragraphs of the Pro-
gramme of Action of the Conference. In most countries, the neglect of women's
reproductive rights severely limits their opportunities in public and private life,
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In contrast, the right to be free from violence, unlike reproductive
choice, is far less controversial. Most states are willing to accede that all
individuals ought to be free from the threat of extrajudicial violence."'
Such a right is supported by the UDHR, which encourages states to pro-
vide equal protection of the laws to all its citizens."'6 While the
declaration is addressed to states and concerns the prevention of gov-
ernmental breaches of human rights, it is now understood that failures to
curb private abuses amount to a breach of human rights precisely be-
cause of the equal protection provisions."' Barbara Stark has argued that
human rights frameworks, like domestic U.S. law, no longer recognize
the traditional public-private dichotomy."8 This means that family vio-
lence is no longer a matter of private concern, but rather a public
problem that requires state intervention."
While CEDAW, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR provide the positive
legal framework for preventing violence as a human rights abuse, per-
haps the most important normative statement about violence as a
gendered problem in particular is the Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women (DEVAW), a resolution passed by the U.N.
General Assembly on December 20, 1993.120 The resolution reiterates the
key points of Liberal feminist legal doctrine against violence by: recog-
nizing violence as a violation of women's liberty and right to life;
eliminating the public-private sphere dichotomy; holding states respon-
sible for upholding women's right to equal protection of the law and
enforcing sanctions against private actors; and, recognizing that violence
comes in many forms. 2' Of particular interest is the fact that the declara-
tion recognizes the work of the women's movement in "drawing
increasing attention to the nature, severity and magnitude of the problem
including opportunities for education and economic and political empowerment.
The ability of women to control their own fertility forms an important basis for the
enjoyment of other rights. Shared responsibility between women and men in mat-
ters related to sexual and reproductive behaviour is also essential to improving
women's health.
United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4-15, 1995, Beijing Platform for
Action, 95-97, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (Oct. 17, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/
esa/ gopher-data/conf/fwcw/off/a--20.en.
115. See id. Mission Statement, 12.
116. See UDHR, supra note 96.
117. See id.
118. See Stark, supra note 93, at 1575-76.
119. Id.
120. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter DEVAW], available at http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm.
121. Id.
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of violence against women." 2  In 2008, the General Assembly adopted
another resolution, "Intensification of the efforts to eliminate all forms of
violence against women," to reaffirm the need to tackle gender violence
and again calling for states to criminalize violence against women and
take adequate measures for its prevention.12
Although some of the particular problems with the international ap-
proach will be taken up in the next Section, it is worth noting here the
focus on the state and its use of police power and regulation. While hu-
man rights proponents have historically understood that violations of
those rights often come at the hands of the state, they are nevertheless
proponents of state power when it comes to regulation in these areas.124
2. The Loci of Exchange: Export-Import of Legal Ideas
and Strategies at International Meetings
The preceding Section does not begin to scratch the surface of the
number of documents that have been generated by international and
transnational actors on the issue of reproductive rights and violence
against women. It does, however, sketch an outline of the international
laws that activists and scholars rely on when advocating for women's
rights. In this Section, I examine the marketplace or the loci where the
exchange of information takes place. Specifically, what kinds of episte-
mological transactions take place at such meetings, how do the
negotiations occur, and what is "understood" by the key actors when
they say that "women's rights are human rights?"
International meetings like those held in Beijing and Nairobi are the
locations at which women from across the globe congregate to build
transnational networks and coalitions around specific women's issues. At
these meetings, delegates from both states and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) work to create a shared set of goals and
understandings about the pressing issues facing women."s Typically,
while many documents are produced at these meetings, an important
consensus document is produced that sets out the problems and goals of
122. Id. para. 10.
123. The resolution was drafted by the Belgian and Netherlands representatives of the
Third Committee of the General Assembly which deals with human rights issues. U.N. Secre-
tary-General, Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Violence Against Women,
U.N. Doc. A/65/208 (Aug. 2, 2010).
124. See generally INST. OF Soc. STUDIES TRUST, PROGRESS OF WOMEN IN SOUTH ASIA
2007 (2007)[hereinafter ISST] (discussing strategies for prevention of trafficking and violence
against women). For a comprehensive picture of specific provisions of international instru-
ments relating to women, see infra Table 1.
125. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS & GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 44-46 (2006).
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the participant stakeholders. 2 6 Sally Engle Merry describes the arduous
process of building consensus that takes place around such official
documents:
The debates about wording proceeded with virtually no discus-
sion of the reasoning behind various positions or the evidence
for or against them. Most of the time, delegates simply sug-
gested wording changes. It is likely that the substantive debates
had already taken place during the deliberations before the fi-
nal meeting. But there were still major differences of opinion
in the room. For example, is globalization responsible for
women's poverty around the world? Should women have the
right to abort their unborn children? Are wealthy countries
willing to pay for reforms in poorer countries? Is the basis for
social order secular or religious? It seems unlikely that eviden-
tiary arguments would produce agreement on these questions.
Instead, the strategy of finding phrases that are vague and con-
voluted was a way to reach consensus. Word-smithing
produced a single document despite gaping disparities in views
about women's place in society.'27
The intense negotiations that attend the creation of the documents do
not reflect a shared set of understandings about the problems women
face or how to solve them. Instead, they reflect a more superficial and
broad agreement that there are problems and that they need attention.
Beyond the pithy slogan of "women's rights are human rights" lurks the
reality that women cannot be reduced to a universal category and that
there are disagreements over which women need to be helped, what re-
forms need to be done, who should undertake those reforms, and how it
should be funded. The vague language in the documents glosses over
these serious divergences in understanding and level of commitment.
A more frequent set of smaller meetings that occur is that of the
CEDAW Committee. The Committee oversees and monitors compliance
with CEDAW by signatories. The membership of the Committee consists
of representatives who are gender experts from signatory countries, who
meet twice a year to hear reports from select countries.128 During these
126. See, e.g., CEDAW, Ways and Means of Expediting the Work of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Overview of the Working Methods of the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 37th Sess., Jan. 15-Feb. 2, 2007,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2007/11/4/Add. 1 (Oct. 25, 2006).
127. MERRY, supra note 125, at 46.
128. See CEDAW, supra 126; see also MERRY, supra note 125, at 78-79. The adoption
of the optional protocol gives individuals standing to bring complaints directly to the attention
of the Committee. Early proponents of individual standing likely expected that the optional
protocol would give women, and particularly Third World women, a way to bring their subor-
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meetings, the states provide reports on their progress toward meeting
CEDAW goals and the Committee then holds a pre-session in which it
works through the report and raises questions and issues of concern.19
The state representatives are given advance warning of these and are
prepared to face the formal Committee in the regular session, which con-
sists of an oral exchange between the Committee members and the
representatives.O NGO participants are allowed limited interventions
that take the form of written statements, but rarely are NGO representa-
tives allowed to speak.'3
Nevertheless, vigorous NGO activity accompanies that of the official
meetings, creating a critical venue for activists to gather, exchange in-
formation and strategy, and build networks.'32 One of the primary
functions of the NGOs at such meetings is to raise new issues for their
counterparts-and sometimes the Committee-to consider. Despite this
vital role played by NGOs, many are excluded from the discussion given
the high cost of travel to either New York City or Geneva. Consequently,
the discussions are dominated by delegates from NGOs that are part of a
group of "transnational elites."'" The space in which these NGOs oper-
ate is a transnational space heavily influenced by the West, though not
dominated by it, considering that it also includes elites from the Global
South.'34 As Merry notes, it is a space "within which people from all over
the world participate to produce a social reformist, fundamentally neo-
liberal vision of modernity governed by concepts of human rights."' In
other words, although there are differences in approach, there is a fun-
damental baseline consensus about "the value of the autonomous self,
the capacity to make choices among alternative cultural paths, the
dination to light and shame their otherwise under-enforcing and lax governments into acting.
Yet, the cases brought under CEDAW are mostly minority women bringing actions against
First World, highly-industrialized countries. In one example, a woman brought a case against
Spain claiming a violation of equal protection because the hereditary family title of nobility
had passed to her younger brother rather than herself. CEDAW, Decision of the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Under the Optional Protocol to the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Communication No.
7/2005, submitted by Cristina Muiioz-Vargas y Sainz de Vicufia, 39th Sess., July 23-Aug. 10,
2007, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/7/2005 (Aug. 9, 2007).
129. See CEDAW, supra note 126.
130. Id. In 7, 13, at 3-4.
131. Id. 39, at 10; see also MERRY, supra note 125, at 70.
132. Sally Engle Merry's work describing the interaction of non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) and governments in the CEDAW monitoring process is an invaluable
anthropological contribution to understanding how human rights travel in the transnational
arena. See MERRY, supra note 125, at 86-87.
133. Id. at 54-55, 82.
134. Id. at 99-100.
135. Id. at 100.
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protection of physical autonomy and the possession of rights."16 The
space and the actors in it reflect each other's modernity and cultural and
educational hybridity, resulting in the near absence of the alternative
views lived out in the real lives of many women. In sum, the women who
are purported to be the "beneficiaries" of these meetings become subal-
tern, rendered invisible and silent. Instead of actually being all-
encompassing, the women engaged in rights activism on behalf of all
women only represent those who are deeply committed to Liberal ideas
of personhood, Liberal social arrangements, and a politico-legal order
that reflects the unilinear progress of Liberal history. Unsurprisingly, the
predominant view of women's identity is coextensive with that of Lib-
eral feminism.
B. The "Universal" Woman: A Traveling Subject
The transnational meeting is a space in which the global elite come
to produce not only the vision of modernity Merry describes, but also a
universal feminist subject-an idealized subordinated woman who is cre-
ated through the discourse of Liberal feminism.' As a product of
Liberal thought, it is no surprise that this subject is a close kin to the
U.S. feminist subject. Although the discourse that produces the feminist
subject has encountered criticism and been fractured within the United
States, the international human rights discourse remains dominated by
Second Wave Liberal notions of equality, autonomy, and choice and has
marginalized its critics. Indeed, the idealized person of Liberalism is so
closely mirrored in the Universal Woman that she does not require much
description. To describe the Universal Woman would be to repeat many
of the characteristics of the American Woman.' Because the Global
North funds much of the participation in international meetings and pro-
duces much of the technical and theoretical knowledge, it is not
surprising that women's rights advocates from the Global South tend to
agree with the structure of human rights and the international pressure to
reform in ways that promote Liberalism.'
But what about the critiques? Why do they not travel and work to
destabilize the hegemony of Liberal discourse? Transnational feminist
organizing around women's issues, as orchestrated by elites, has inter-
136. Id. at 101.
137. By "universal feminist subject,' I mean to denote the theoretical and idealized per-
sonhood that emerges from the discourse of Liberal feminism. The formation of subjects has
been written about by philosophers ranging from Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger to Foucault and
recently Judith Butler. Most relevant to the discussion here is the work by Butler on gender
and the creation of "woman" as a subject.
138. See supra notes 62-92 and accompanying text.
139. See MERRY, supra note 125, at 54-55.
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nalized difference through multiculturalism (much like Second Wave
feminism does in the United States). A commitment to multiculturalism
or diversity does not displace the centrality of human rights, and its hid-
den cultural content shifts the focus to other cultures that differ and are
therefore in need of reform.'" Yet the tolerance of cultural difference es-
poused in transnational multiculturalism is superficial. Elites from the
Global South experience culture as part and parcel of a neoliberal
choice-driven modern society.' 4 ' That is to say, they conceive of culture
and religion as choices that can be made when such culture or religion
diverges from the mainstream Liberal culture and religion. However,
they fail to interrogate the utterly normalized and, thereby inscrutable,
cultural space they inhabit. Instead it is made to appear as though Liber-
alism has no culture or religious valence.142 The only women who are
truly "different" are those who are immersed in the local or those who
adhere to different political ideologies like socialism, communism, Hin-
dutva, or Islamism-those whose culture and religion is worn on their
skin and enacted in peculiar rituals and practices that suggest pre-
modernity.143
140. See, e.g., Choudhury, supra note 82, at 153.
141. See BROWN, supra note 66, at 188-89 (2006). As Brown notes:
Liberal tolerance discourse not only hides its own imbrication with Christianity and
bourgeois culture, it sheaths the cultural chauvinism that liberalism carries to its en-
counters with nonliberal cultures. For example, when Western liberals express
dismay at (what is perceived as mandatory) veiling in fundamentalist Islamic con-
texts, this dismay is justified through the idiom of women's choice. But the contrast
between the nearly compulsory baring of skin by American teenage girls and com-
pulsory veiling in a few Islamic societies is drawn routinely as absolute lack of
choice, indeed tyranny, "over there" and absolute freedom of choice (representa-
tively redoubled by near-nakedness) "over here." This is not to deny differences
between the two dress codes and the costs of defying them, but rather to note the
means and effects of converting these differences into hierarchicalized opposites. If
successful American women are not free to veil, are not free to dress like men or
boys, are not free to wear whatever they choose on any occasion without severe
economic and social consequences, then what sleight of hand recasts their condition
as freedom and individuality contrasted with hypostasized tyranny and lack of
agency? What makes choices "freer" when they are constrained by secular and
market organizations of femininity and fashion rather than by state or religious law?
Do we imagine the former to be less coercive than the latter because we cling to the
belief that power is only and always a matter of law and sovereignty . . . ?
Id.
142. Id.
143. See infra notes 285-304 and accompanying text (describing Liberal feminism's
view of difference in the work of Susan Moller Okin).
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III. ARRIVING IN SOUTH ASIA:'" LOCAL CONTEXTS,
TRANSLATIONS, AND RESISTANCES
Transnational feminist projects are typically aimed at the social
problems that transnational organizations and feminists recognize as pri-
ority issues. In Parts I and II, this Article traced the development of two
family law projects in the United States and then mapped the laws that
reflected these projects in the international arena. 14 Having thus ex-
plained how legal reform priorities are set and uploaded into the
international realm, Part III explores how these reforms are transplanted
into the local sphere and investigates the subjects on which they operate.
Given the global activist and media focus on reproductive rights and vio-
lence against women in the South, it would be easy to assume: first, that
the local laws are wholly inadequate to the task of protecting and pro-
moting women's rights; second, that reproductive rights and violence are
the leading agenda items for women in the Global South. This part of the
Article challenges these simplistic assumptions and provides a more nu-
anced account of local challenges. In the first Section, it examines the
laws already in place and how reforms have either been undertaken or
proposed to bring them in compliance with international human rights
obligations and norms. These reforms raise a number of questions:
(1) for whom are these reforms undertaken; (2) are these legal reforms
appropriate or adequate to achieve their purported goals; and (3) what
consequences flow from these reforms? This Section begins by under-
scoring the many societal, economic, and political problems that
complicate issues of reproductive rights and violence in the South Asian
context. It then explores the local subject and the encounters between
universal and particular subjects.
A. Law (Not Culture): Placing Reproductive Choice
and Domestic Violence in Context
South Asia is one of the most densely populated regions in the
world. With a combined population of over 1.3 billion people, resources
to support the large population are limited and the region suffers from
144. South Asia as a geographic region consists of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. See World Bank, South Asia: Countries,
http://www.worldbank.org/ (follow "Countries" hyperlink; then follow "South Asia" under
"Browse By Region"; then follow the "Countries" hyperlink in the lefthand column) (last
visited Sept. 19, 2010). In this Article, I focus more closely on the Indian Subcontinental
countries of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. The term "South Asia" is often used as a neutral
signifier of this sub-region. See SUGATA BOSE & AYESHA JALAL, MODERN SOUTH ASIA: His-
TORY, CULTURE, POLITICAL ECONOMY 3 (2004).
145. See supra notes 9-82 and accompanying text.
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great distributive inequities.'4 ' The bottom twenty-five percent of the
population lives in abject poverty.147 Moreover, poverty impacts women
disparately.148 Most women in South Asia work in the informal economy
and in households.149 Their labor is uncompensated or undercompen-
sated.5 o A truism among some development experts holds that a high
birth rate contributes to poverty and impedes national advancement into
industrialization."' As such, for rural and poor women, all discussions
about reproductive choice are imbedded in the larger discourse of eco-
nomic development, population control, and access to health care.
Because economic development, poverty, and population are so closely
linked, activists working to secure reproductive rights for women in
South Asia make quite different arguments for those rights.'
1. Abortion and Reproductive Rights
Feminist advocacy based on privacy or autonomy-while perfectly
comprehensible to the educated liberal elite-is not as easily compre-
hended by the majority of the undereducated, rural, and poor of South
Asia.154 As such, laws tend to be roughly normative, reflecting the socie-
tal values and political preferences that prevail. In Bangladesh, for
instance, abortion is criminalized unless there is a threat to the life of the
woman. This law was promulgated by the British in 1860 and has not
been reformed since.'"' Medical abortion as a right based in personal
146. SHANTAYANAN DEVARAJAN & IJAZ NABI, WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN
SOUTH ASIA: PROMISING, UN-EQUALIZING,...SUSTAINABLE? 4-6 (2006), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/South-Asia-growthJune_2
006.pdf.
147. Id. at 4.
148. See ISST, supra note 124, at 1-4.
149. Id.
150. MAHBUB UL HAQ HUMAN DEV. CTR., HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA
2000: THE GENDER QUESTION 6 (2000), available at http://www.mhhdc.org/reports/
hdrsa%202000.pdf.
151. See, e.g., id. at 14.
152. See id. at 25-33 (discussing access to health care and the impact of economic poli-
cies on women in South Asia).
153. See DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES WITH WOMEN FOR A NEW ERA, http://
www.dawnnet.org/index.php (focusing on maternal health); see also, Bishakha Datta and
Geetanjali Misra Advocacy for Sexual and Reproductive Health: The Challenge in India, in
Reproductive Health Matters Vol. 8, No. 16, Reproductive Rights, Advocacy and Changing the
Law 24-34 (Nov., 2000) (discussing access to health care and lack of institutional capacity).
154. MAHBUB UL HAQ HUMAN DEV. CTR., supra note 150, at 131 (discussing the differ-
ence in decision-making power of educated and undereducated women).
155. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION Div., DEP'T OF EcON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, 1 ABORTION
POLICIES: A GLOBAL REVIEW 47-48 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/
publications/abortion/ (follow "Coutry Profiles" hyperlink and then "Bangladesh" hyperlink).
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autonomy is not legally protected.' 6 However, abortion issues are closely
bound up in the need for methods of birth control due to the socioeco-
nomic pressure from a growing population. Because population control
is considered a priority, Bangladesh provides for menstrual regulation5 1
until eight weeks after the last menstrual period and this is not construed
as an abortion at all, but rather as a public health intervention.' In ef-
fect, it is a chemical abortion if the woman is indeed pregnant but
verification of pregnancy is not required to undergo menstrual regulation
treatment. As a result, the moral implications of abortion can be side-
stepped."9
In India, which was governed by the same British code as Bangla-
desh at its independence, abortion has been decriminalized since the
1970s through the passage of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy
Act.1' Abortion is available on demand, at least theoretically, if not prac-
tically. However, along with abortion on demand came the problem of
sex selection.161 Coupled with abortion, malnutrition, neglect, and, some-
times, infanticide, it has led to a skewed gender ratio.' 62 Typically, there
should be more females than males, however, in India there are more
males. Sex-selective abortion and infanticide account for the large num-
ber of these "missing women."'63 Despite legal efforts to prevent the
156. See MAHBUB UL HAQ HUMAN DEV. CTR., supra note 150, at 118-133 (discussing
women's health, maternal mortality, and population).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 48. ("Despite the restrictive nature of the law, 'menstrual regulation' services
have been available in the Government's family planning programme. The Government does
not feel that this service conflicts with current abortion laws as it provides menstrual regula-
tion as a family planning method, not as an abortifacient.").
159. Id. Menstrual regulation (MR) is, in essence, an early term chemical abortion if the
woman is, in fact, pregnant. However, because women seeking MR do not actually have to
establish pregnancy to obtain the procedure, they do not fall foul of the abortion law. The
procedure, therefore, operates in the space between prevention of pregnancy and abortion.
Furthermore, it is a procedure that can be performed on an outpatient basis and by trained
providers not necessarily physicians, making it ideal for developing and rural populations. See
UNITED NATIONS POPULATION Div., supra note 155.
160. See Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, No. 34 of 1971, INDIA CODE (1993),
available at http://www.indiacode.nic.in/ (follow "Short Title" hyperlink, then search for
"Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act"). The Act was amended in 2002 and provides for the
criminal punishment of abortion providers if they are not medical practitioners. Moreover,
abortions may only be done at hospitals. Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment)
Act, No. 64 of 2002, INDIA CODE §§ 4, 5 (1993), available at http://www.indiacode.nic.in/
(follow "Short Title" hyperlink, then search for "Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amend-
ment) Act").
161. See Kristi Lemoine & John Tanagho, Gender Discrimination Fuels Sex Selective
Abortion: The Impact of the Indian Supreme Court on the Implementation and Enforcement of
the PNDTAct, 15 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 203 (2007).
162. Id. at 205, 207-09.
163. Amartya Sen, Missing Women-Revisited 327 BRIT. MED. J. 1297, 1297(2003); see
also AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM, 104-07 (1999).
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practice of sex-selection, it continues to occur. In 2002, the Pre-Natal
Diagnostic Techniques Amendment Act was passed, limiting the use of
diagnostic testing to those cases where the health of the fetus is in ques-
tion and specifically preventing providers from disclosing sex.
While Indian women have a measure of choice in controlling their
reproduction through liberalized abortion laws, they have also been sub-
ject to state pressure. Rural women in particular have borne the brunt of
the state's need to reduce birth rates and population and have been vic-
tims of coercive policies, including compulsory sterilization.
In some respects, the broader state regulatory concern cuts against re-
productive rights if constructed narrowly as the right to abortion, aimed at
bettering women's lives. For some women, it is the opposite that is threat-
ened: the right to have as many children as they desire,' or even the right
to have girl children. When sex-selection is put into the picture of ex-
tended families, with reproductive decision-making power placed in the
hands of husbands and in-laws, it is unclear that a right to abortion on de-
mand is either empowering to the child-bearer or women in general. What
are the effects, then, of advocating freedom to choose without considera-
tion for these ground realities? What would the legal freedom to abort
provide for women who have limited access to basic health care in a soci-
ety that is actively engaged in population control? And what does it mean
when the overall sociopolitical landscape is shifting to more liberalization
and privatization and away from the socialism that, at least discursively,
made space for government provision of services? The Liberal answer has
often been a greater push in promoting individual rights.6 1
Pakistan, which also shares the same legal history, revised its abor-
tion laws in the 1990s to reflect shari'ah law.'16 In the West, the very
spectre of "shari'ah" calls to mind a set of medieval and brutal legal
164. Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Amend-
ment Act, 2002, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, §§ 4-6, 2003 (India), available at http://
www.medindia.net/indianhealth_act/pre-natal-diagnostic-techniques-amendment-act-2002-
amendment-of-section-4-5-6.htm.
165. See Kaval Gulhati, Compulsory Sterilization: The Change in India's Population
Policy, 195 SCIENCE 1300, 1304-05 (1977); see also M. Minkler, "Thinking the Unthink-
able": The Prospect of Compulsory Sterilization in India, 7 INT'L. J. HEALTH SERV. 237
(1977) (discussing the National Population Policy Statement adopted by the Indian Govern-
ment in 1976 and the subsequent critiques of coercive and compulsory sterilization measures).
166. See Gulhati, supra note 165, at 1303 (noting that the right to have children is sacro-
sanct to women in rural India).
167. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 70, 59-86, 246 (2000) (the capabilities approach is
by definition an individualistic approach examining the ways in which each individuals per-
sonal capabilities are realized or thwarted).
168. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION Div., DEP'T OF EcON. & Soc. AFFAIRs, 3 ABORTION
POLICIEs: A GLOBAL REVIEw 20 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/
publications/abortion/ (follow "Coutry Profiles" hyperlink and then "Pakistan" hyperlink).
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punishments and oppressions."9 Yet, interestingly, the law is not as re-
strictive as one might imagine. Under the new laws, abortion is not
prohibited when used to save the life of the mother or to provide neces-
sary treatment.' This ambiguity in the law allows for an early term
abortion for therapeutic purposes other than explicitly saving the life of
the mother.' If it does not fall within the legal exceptions, the punish-
ment for an illegal abortion depends on when during the pregnancy the
abortion is performed. 7 2 Before the organs of the fetus are formed, the
illegal termination of a pregnancy is considered a ta'zir crime, punish-
able by imprisonment for three to ten years' After the limbs are formed,
abortion is punishable as a diyah crime, which requires compensation to
be paid to the heirs similar to a murder. 7 4 Islamic criminal law treats
murder very much like a wrongful death tort.' As such, unless there has
been a hybridization of the law with that of common law European sys-
tems, the punishment for murder is either the death penalty (under a
theory of lex talionis) or compensation paid to the victim's family, de-
pending on the family's choice.' 6 Under Islamic law, the limbs and
organs are considered to be formed by the fourth month.' Thus, before
the fourth month, an abortion would be a ta'zir crime but after that time,
it would be treated as a diyah crime. If the shari'ah were applied strictly,
a ta'zir, early term abortion would be punished more severely with a
lengthy prison sentence than a later term abortion which only requires
monetary compensation to the heirs of the victim.
Despite the reform of the law to conform to shari'ah, the enforce-
ment of laws against abortion is lax. The reality of most women's
situations is that they do not have access to health care,"' therefore the
169. See, e.g., Dipesh Gadher et al., Rowan Williams Faces Backlash Over Sharia, SUNDAY
TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2008, para. 20, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/
article3342059.ece; see generally SHERENE H. RAZACK, CASTING OUT: THE EvICTION OF Mus-
LIMS FROM WESTERN LAW & POLITICS (2008) (exploring the use of stereotypical
characterizations of Muslim society and the contemporary legal and social responses to Muslims
in the West).
170. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION Div., supra note 168, at 19-20.
171. Id. at 20.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. See also Dr. Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Panel on Religious and Ethical Perspectives on
Population Issues: Family Planning and Islamic Jurisprudence 4-5 (May 19, 1993), available
at http://www.karamah.org/docs/family-planning-islam.doc. But see Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a ban on "partial birth" abortions).
175. See KNUT VIKOR, BETWEEN GOD AND THE SULTAN: A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW
287-90 (2005).
176. Id. at 288.
177. UNITED NATIONS POPULATION Div., supra note 168, at 20.
178. See ISST, supra note 124, at 15-22 (providing statistics of hospital beds and gross
domestic product (GDP) expenditures on health, and concluding that there is a lack of ade-
quate access to health care).
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laws either allowing them to obtain a legal abortion or obstructing them
from doing so are essentially a theoretical debate about women's roles
and rights. Even if the laws were changed, lack of health care providers
would still prevent medically supervised abortions.' Thus, international
pressure to conform laws to allow for abortion on demand may not make
much sense without the funding and structural reforms in health care to
provide the service. Moreover, increased attention to abortion as con-
structed in the West might have perverse effects. As al-Hibri notes,
where a fluid understanding of abortion as a social practice was present,
after the right became a major transnational human rights concern, rigid,
overly legalistic, and conservative interpretations of abortion in Islam
emerged, making it more restricted than it was previously.so
2. Domestic Violence
Advocacy for domestic violence prevention, one might imagine,
would be less problematic than for abortion rights because of a general,
global consensus that spousal violence is both morally and criminally
wrong. But here also there are some key concerns. First, it is a fact that
domestic violence is a major problem in many households in South
Asia.'"' Dowry deaths, honor killings, and forced marriage have all
been well publicized in the West. As signatories to CEDAW and be-
cause of organized activism, several governments in South Asia have
passed legislation aimed at reducing or eliminating violence against
women. In Bangladesh, for example, the Oppression of Women and
Children Act'8 2 passed in 1995, provides for the death penalty for
dowry murder,83 rape of a woman or child,'" minimum sentences for
acid violence,'85 and a prohibition on the trafficking of women and
179. Id.
180. Azizah al-Hibri, Who Defines Women's Rights? A Third World Woman's Response,
2 Hum. RTs. BRIEF, Fall 1994, at 9. al-Hibri asserts that:
In the case of abortion rights specifically, in certain Muslim countries the result was
to produce a highly conservative official juristic analysis of the issue. This presents
a retrenchment, since, for hundreds of years, Muslim jurists have had quite a liberal
analysis of abortion, and, unlike the situation that used to exist in the United States,
safe abortions were widely available in many Muslim countries.
Id. 119-10.
181. See ISST, supra note 124, at 27-40.
182. Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act, No. 18 of 1995, THE
BANGLADESH GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY, July 17, 1995, available at http://www.
commonlii.org/bdlegis/ num act/oowaceal995466/.
183. Id. § 10.
184. Id. §§ 6, 7.
185. Id. §§ 4, 5. Acid violence is the use of acid to disfigure women physically as pun-
ishment. The punishment could be for romantic rejection or other perceived slights. See ACID
SURVIVORS FOUNDATION, http://www.acidsurvivors.org/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
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children.86 This Act was amended in 2000 with the Women and Chil-
dren Repression Prevention Act to strengthen existing laws pertaining
to violence against women and children.'" In addition, the legislature
has created a draft bill on domestic violence that has yet to be enacted.
The bill, if passed, would provide for expanded punishment for domes-
tic violence in all forms and stronger criminal enforcement.' At the
time it was proposed, NGO organizations criticized the bill for relying
on "enforcement" more than protection and for not providing measures
to punish police officials for abuse.8 9
As the most politically stable democratic state in South Asia, In-
dia's legal enactments against similar problems are manifold. Laws
against child marriage, dowry, dowry-related violence, and sexual har-
assment have been on the books for decades.'" More recently, India
passed the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005'91
which:
[P]rotects all members of a household, and it embraces the de-
finition of violence adopted by the United Nations as being any
form of abuse, whether emotional, physical, sexual, or verbal.
It also offers a wide range of new protection measures: injunc-
tions, protective orders, and maintenance and custody orders.
186. See Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act, supra note 182,
§§ 8, 9. In a recent ruling, the Bangladesh High Court overturned a portion of this Act as
unconstitutional because it contemplates the death penalty as the only form of punishment for the
murder of a victim pursuant to rape. See Death Penalty Declared Illegal, DAILY
STAR (Bangladesh), Mar. 3, 2010, at 1, http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-
details.php?nid=128499.
187. Women and Children Repression Prevention Act, No. 8 of 2000, Feb. 14, 2000
(Bangl.), available at www.hsph.harvard.edulpopulation/trafficking/BANGLADESH.traf.00.pdf
(unofficial translation). For an overview of the impact of this amendment, see Taslima Man-
soor, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied, DAILY STAR, Mar. I1, 2006 (Law & Our Rights),
http://www.thedailystar.net/law/2006/03/02/index.htm.
188. For the text of the proposed bill, see Government of People's Republic of Bangla-
desh, The Law Commission, A Final Report On The Proposed Law Of Domestic Violance
[sic] Along With A Draft Bill Namely, The Domestic Violance [sic] Act, 200... [sic] (Dec. 29,
2005), www.lawcommissionbangladesh.org/reports/l1.pdf.
189. See Hana Shams Ahmed, When It Also Happens at Home, FORUM, May 2009,
available at http://www.thedailystar.net/foruml/2009/may/happens.htm; Bangladesh: The
Draft Bill on Domestic Violence-Some Recommendations, WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM
LAWs (July 15, 2006), http://www.wluml.org/node/3069 ("ASK [Ain o Shalish Kendra] is
concerned about the role of "enforcement officer" in the draft Bill, which makes the police
directly responsible for receiving and investigating complaints under the Bill- In addition, the
Bill lacks any punishment or complaints mechanism for enforcement officers.").
190. See generally FLAVIA AGNES, LAW AND GENDER INEQUALITY: THE POLITICS OF
WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN INDIA (1999) (discussing the issue of gender and law reform and the
strategies to protect women's rights in India).
191. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, No. 43 of 2005, INDIA
CODE (1993), available at http://www.indiacode.nic.in/ (follow "Short Title" hyperlink, then
search for "Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act").
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The common practice of throwing a married woman out of her
home is now illegal, and while there is still no law making ma-
rital rape a crime, the 2005 act opens the door to make it So.192
The 2005 Act has been criticized by traditionalists and right-wing
parties who claim that it is aimed at destroying the institution of family
and traditional gender roles. 93 More disturbing are the problems with
the Act's treatment of women as only victims and not perpetrators, the-
reby ignoring the male victims of domestic abuse. 94 Further, it is
overbroad in its definition of verbal and emotional abuse by including
in its definition "insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults
or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male
child." 95 This would allow a single instance of domestic disharmony to
be considered abuse. Moreover, under the shared housing provision
women are allowed to remain in the marital home if they are the vic-
tims of domestic abuse.196 A magistrate may require the abuser to
remove himself and, in addition, may restrain his relatives from enter-
ing any part of the house in which the victim resides thereby providing
the woman with shelter rather than requiring her to provide it for her-
self.97 Clearly, this provision envisions a multi-room home that is
primarily the luxury of wealthy Indians. In poorer houses, enforcing
such a provision may remove the husband's family from the house en-
tirely.'98 Further, a wife's actions that contribute to the abuse are not
taken into consideration by the courts.'" Thus an adulterous wife could
report an argument over her adultery as domestic abuse and have the
husband removed from the house, as long as the argument included a
threat. Finally, the Act allows magistrates to jail a husband for violat-
ing a protective order on the sole testimony of the wife.2w This
punishment, which could be as much as a year or include a fine for up
to 20,000 rupees ($415 USD), is an unreasonable amount for most
192. India: Better Legal Options Equal More Justice for Women, UNIFEM (Nov. 22,
2006), http://www.unifem.org/gender issues/voicesfromthefield/story.php?StorylD=543.
193. See Mehak Khanna, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2006-Was It
Worth the Effort?, LEGAL SERVICES INDIA (Jan. 21, 2008), http://www.legalserviceindia.com/
articlelIl50-Protection-of-Women-from-Domestic-Violence-Act.htm (discussing the criti-
cisms of the Act); see also Rajesh Vakharia & Siff Nagpur, Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act,2005-A Complete Eyewash by Feminists, INDIA POST (Aug. 5,
2010), available at http://www.theindiapost.com/articles/protection-of-women-from-domestic-
violence-act2005-%E2%80%93-a-complete-eyewash-by-feminists.
194. This is evident in the very title of the act. See supra note 191.
195. See id. Ch. II, § 3, Explanation I (iii)(a).
196. Id. Ch. IV, § 17.
197. Id. Ch. IV, § 19.
198. See id.
199. See supra note 196 (noting that a "traitorous wife" can retain the marital home).
200. Id. Ch. V, § 31(2).
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201Indians, whose per capita income is $2,800 USD a year. Unless a
woman has independent means, the punitive measures in these reforms
will undoubtedly adversely affect her as well.
In Pakistan, the issues of domestic violence have increasingly be-
come mired in the fight against extremist Islamist movements like the
Taliban.202 For example, honor killings have been the focus of anti-
violence activism. To this end, Pakistan has amended some of its laws
to punish domestic murder more seriously. For example, the parliament
passed The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2004 which makes
changes such as minimum sentences and the removal of discretion in
203the existing criminal code to deal more effectively with honor crimes.
Further, the Protection of Women (Criminal's Laws Amendment) Act,
2006 was enacted in December 2 0 06.204 The purpose of this law is to
bring the laws related to zina (adultery or fornication) and qazf (a false
allegation of adultery or fornication), both part of the Hudood Ordi-
nance of 1979,205 in conformity with the stated objectives of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan and its constitutional mandate. 206 In 2009, Paki-
stan's National Assembly passed the Domestic Violence (Prevention
and Protection) Bill.207 The bill defines domestic violence broadly as
"all intentional acts of gender based or other physical or psychological
abuse committed by an accused against women, children or other vul-
nerable persons, with whom the accused is or has been in a domestic
201. Development Data: India at a Glance, WORLD BANK, 2 (Dec. 9, 2009), http://
devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/ind-aag.pdf.
202. See Huma Yusuf, Pakistan's Taliban Rising? Ask the Women, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONI-
TOR, May 26, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/0526/p06s07-
wosc.html; see also Karen Engle, Liberal Internationalism, Feminism, and the Suppression of
Critique: Contemporary Approaches to Global Order in the United States, 46 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 427, 429-34 (2005). Although Engle is concerned primarily with Afghanistan, the War on
Terror has rendered the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan so porous that the latter now
likely faces similar threats from similar foes.
203. An Act Further to Amend the Pakistan Penal Code, PAK. PENAL CODE (Act XLV of
1860), amended by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, No. I of 2005. It has been argued that
this amendment does not go far enough in curbing the practices of honor killing. For a discus-
sion of various provisions of the amendment, see Confronting Honor Killings: Asian Center
for Human Rights Report, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG (Oct. 29, 2004), http://www.
countercurrents.org/ hr-achr291004.htm.
204. The Pakistani Penal Code Act, No. 45 of 1860, amended by Protection of Women
(Amendment) Act, available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/2006/wpb.html.
205. Hadd offences are those that are specifically named in the Qur'an and bear specific
punishments. There are very few hadd offences, among most schools of thought these are:
theft, banditry or fomenting unrest, unlawful sexual intercourse, false accusation of unlawful
sexual intercourse, drinking of alcohol, and apostasy. See RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUN-
ISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 53 (2005).
206. PAKISTAN CONST. pmbl.
207. The Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Bill of 2009, available at
www.na.gov.pk/passed-bill/domestic violence2009.pdf.
300 [Vol. 32:259
Globalizing Family Law Progress
relationship,"208 and provides a number of preventative as well as puni-
tive measures.2 " However, the Senate has failed to act on the bill and it
has not come into force as of this writing."o Of the three countries in
the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan has arguably made the least amount
of progress in amending its law and providing adequate measures for
the prevention of domestic violence. Even general laws that apply to
punish violence against women have been weakly enforced.211 As of
2010, with the increased internal displacement of people from Paki-
stan's Northwest Frontier Province resulting from the conflict in
Afghanistan and the tribal regions of Pakistan, as well as the floods
that same year, it is likely that there will be an increase in domestic
212
violence against vulnerable migrant women. Moreover, the threat of
violence in general, including that against men who are often the heads
of households and protectors of their families, will only put women
more at risk. Law reform that is aimed at reducing domestic violence
will have less of an impact unless adequate attention is given to these
exacerbating factors.
Some of the legal reforms in the area of reproductive rights and
domestic violence undertaken in South Asia have their source in inter-
national pressure to comply with international human rights
obligations, such as those contained in CEDAW.213 However, there is
also considerable domestic activism and pressure on governments to
improve the legal standing of women in all the various reaches of the
208. Id. art. 4.
209. The Act makes provision for counseling, the aggrieved party's right to reside in a
household, protection orders and residence orders, monetary relief, custody orders, and police
protection. Interestingly, there is no provision in the bill for criminal punishment except in the
event of a violation of a protective order. See id. arts. 6-13.
210. Pakistan: Expedite Domestic Violence Legislation, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 11,
2010), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/01/1 l/pakistan-expedite-domestic-violence-
legislation.
211. SAMYA BURNEY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIME OR CUSTOM?: VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN IN PAKISTAN § I (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/
pakistan/; see also Pakistan: Insufficient Protection of Women, Amnesty International
USA, 2007 available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/rossrights/docs/reports/packistan-
amnestyprotection.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
212. See, e.g., Adnan Hyder et al., Intimate Partner Violence Among Afghan Women
Living in Refugee Camps in Pakistan. 64 Soc. SCI. & MEDICINE 1536 (2007); see also Patrick
Duplat, Pakistan: Women Face the Brunt of Displacement, REFUGEES INT'L (Dec. 8, 2009),
http://www.refugeesintemational.org/blog/pakistan-women-face-brunt-displacement (discuss-
ing the unique characteristics that gender based violence can take on in a refugee camp
situation).
213. SOUTH ASIAN TASK FORCE ON ADVANCEMENT OF CEDAW (SATAC), http://www.
aalilegal.org/satac.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010); VIOLENCE, LAW & WOMEN's RIGHTS IN
SOUTH ASIA 14 (Savitri Goonesekere ed., 2004) (discussing the use of international treaties as
a basis for local reform).
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subcontinent without regard to external obligations.2 4 Further, all
women are contemplated as beneficiaries of these reforms regardless of
their particular situations. However, Liberal feminism imagines women
to be more homogenous than they are in reality. Their particularities
are subsumed or privatized, creating an assumption that solutions
which work for one population work for another. Certainly these as-
sumptions are valid when the discussion is undertaken at the level of
generalities and universals like violence, reproductive rights, and other
rights. Yet, the actual effects of these reforms become complex when
the universals of Liberalism come up against the particularities of dif-
ferent women in South Asia.
B. The "Local" Woman: Particularities Meet Universality
Who is the particular woman in South Asia? Although this question
cannot be answered without some level of generalization, in this Sec-
tion the Article will attempt to give as nuanced a picture of women
who are not part of the educated, urbanized, elite as possible. First, the
local woman is the vast majority of the women in South Asia. She is
undereducated, having received substantially less than twelve years of
schooling. She is likely part of an extended family in which she per-
formed household labor since childhood.2 15 She lives in a rural location
embedded in a "traditional" socio-cultural milieu. She likely married
young. She will likely expect to have several children as part of her
role as wife and mother.216 In other words, she is not the autonomous
actor that Liberalism imagines as the ideal.217 Instead, she is deeply im-
bricated in family and society.
The local woman is the subject of scrutiny and regulation from a
number of quarters that constrain the realm of choices that she has and
what are normatively considered appropriate choices.
The following are some of the regulations and constraints that the
local woman faces. First, she is constrained by the expectations of her
family and immediate society. Her choices and capabilities are re-
214. There are a number of women's groups that have been active in India since pre-
Independence to the present. Some of the larger groups are the All India Democratic Women
Association, Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA), the All India Muslim Women's
Personal Law Board, and Manushi-a journal that has focused on feminist organizing-
among others.
215. See ISST, supra note 124, at 22-25; see generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE
GENDER TRAP: WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND POVERTY (2009).
216. See WORLD BANK GROUP, 2006 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS: CARING FOR
MOTHERS (2006), available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Sectionl
1_5.htm.
217. See supra Part I.B.
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stricted through the allocation of resources. Second, she is influenced
by NGOs and welfare groups seeking to expand her opportunities and
capabilities through both social reform and legal reform. 219 Third, she is
regulated and constrained by the state through its own social reform
policies, allocation of resources, and population-control policies. 220 Fi-
nally, she is subject to the influence of transnational and international
forces that may be directly involved in social programs, rule of law
initiatives, foreign policy directed programs, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, armed conflict.22'
Given the number of actors that influence her, it is easy to lose
sight of the woman herself. She becomes a passive recipient of all
these attentions as opposed to an actor. Her subaltern voice is co-opted
by the elite, educated, transnational feminists who represent her at in-
ternational meetings and within the state.222 Nevertheless, these women
are not mute. They have particular ideas about what is a good life for
themselves and their children, and they are articulators of alternative
visions of how to be a woman. Subaltern voices, when they speak for
themselves, often tell of a different vision of flourishing-a vision that
overlaps with other women's visions but is not coextensive.223 For in-
stance, in South Asia, women who belong to particular ethnic and
religious groups and castes express such affiliations as primary, rather
than secondary, to gender.224 For some, a communal affiliation is a mat-
ter of safety and protection from majoritarian violence. 25 Moreover, as
the Article has argued above, as the focus of population-control poli-
cies, poor and minority women have been deprived of their right to
bear children freely rather than being deprived of the right to terminate
their pregnancies. Similarly, with regard to domestic violence, poor
women can face worse immiseration and social ostracism if their hus-
bands, i.e., their primary economic support, are incarcerated. These
realities conflict with the dominant reform policies of elite Liberal
women and color the priorities and choices that poor and minority
women make.
In some cases, the alternative view of womanhood that rural
women articulate is deeply unsettling to urban elites. This is
218. See SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 163, at 115-16.
219. See, e.g., id. at 116 (discussing the role of SEWA in changing the normative views
of women's extra-domestic work).
220. See, e.g., id. at 192-95.
221. See infra notes 237-239 and accompanying text.
222. See MERRY, supra note 125, at 82.
223. See infra notes 245-253 and accompanying text.
224. See Cyra Akila Choudhury, (Mis)Appropriated Liberty: Identity, Gender Justice,
and Muslim Personal Law Reform in India, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 45,77 (2008).
225. Id. at 81-82.
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particularly true when those visions reflect "traditional" notions of
religion, gender roles, and family.226 One explanation for elite Liberal
women's reluctance to accept these alternative articulations is the
belief that rural women suffer from a false consciousness which elite
women-having shed the shackles of tradition, culture and religion-
have overcome. The alternative priorities that are put forth, then, can
easily be dismissed by the fully conscious, better-educated feminist. In
the next Part, I examine some of these priorities.
IV. REORIENTING LIBERAL FEMINIST PRIORITIES: ALTERNATIVE
APPROPRIATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The diagram on the following page represents the direction in
which information about women's rights reform flows. As the Article
has argued in Part I, the Western organizations such as the FMF iden-
tify particular legal reform projects based on domestic experience and
priorities. These are uploaded to the international arena through priori-
ties set by donor agencies and already established human rights norms
that reflect Liberal universal values. Signatories to those conventions
and recipients of donor money are then required to adopt the reform
projects or comply with reform priorities. When the agenda is brought
into the local context, NGOs and the state attempt to translate these
reforms into local laws.227
226. See ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, No TURNING BACK: THE HISTORY OF FEMINISM AND
THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 96-98, 115-17 (2002). For instance, Freedman notes that for work-
ing class women in the Global South, "economic justice, along with cultural and national
sovereignty, must become a priority of feminism." Id. at 115. These priorities, as I argue be-
low, are sometimes in conflict with liberal priorities of individual rights. Moreover, she also
recounts the experience of some women whose entry into politics and consciousness of op-
pression was a result of the oppression of their men. Id. at 115-116.
227. See infra notes 244-253 and accompanying text.
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Resistance to compliance
particularized through
culture and religion.
Legal reform in line with international human rights norms is
undoubtedly progress in the struggle to make women's lives better. It is,
nevertheless, likely that the women who primarily benefit from such
reforms already have a modicum of security in their lives.228 Indeed, those
who are able to take advantage of the law are typically the economically
well-off in South Asia.29 To help the majority of South Asian women, a
different set of reforms is required and Liberal feminist priorities need to
be reoriented. There are at least three alternative priorities that ought to be
considered. First, a human rights reform agenda that does not take the
skewed economic distribution that persists in South Asia as a fundamental
and interwoven problem cannot be effective in improving the lives of
vulnerable women. The precarious position that women are in is made
worse by global financial policies that disproportionately impact
230developing countries. Second, women in the South are adversely
impacted by threats to security resulting from the War on Terror and other
military or police interventions as well as from the degradation of their
228. See, e.g., Cynthia Stephen, Feminism and Dalit Women in India: Some Searching
Questions, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.countercuffents.org/
stephenl61109.htm. As Stephen explains:
The mainstream Indian women's movement continues to be led by privileged do-
minant caste, upper-class, urban feminists. The participation of women factory
workers, dalit women and urban poor are co-opted to make up the numbers. Over-
all, it has not been very successful in capturing the imagination of wider society,
despite notable success in legal reform for women's rights, the provision of some
supportive services and to a certain extent in the media-all areas of concern to the
middle classes. Id.
229. Id.
230. See infra notes 244-253 and accompanying text.
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environment.231 It is often the state itself that victimizes women and, as
such, legal reforms that require harsh enforcement measures to be
undertaken by the state may be counterproductive. Third, and finally,
women's rights cannot be pitted against "culture" and "tradition"
without running the risk of becoming illegitimate in the eyes of the very
women they seek to liberate.232 The judgments of elite women that play
into the civilizing discourses of Liberal imperialism silence the voices of
poor women when they attempt to speak. As a result, poor women are
regarded not as agents in their own right but objects of reform they may
not always want. 233 To be truly effective, Liberal legal feminism must
expand its agenda and its definition of human rights to accommodate the
priorities of local women.
A. Economic Distribution and Globalization
Women in South Asia suffer from endemic poverty that severely im-
pacts their capabilities and those of their children. 23 The issue of poverty
has been on the global agenda for many decades with repeated attempts
by the governments to craft programs that will reduce the number of
poor.235 Despite limited progress, local efforts have also had their draw-
backs. In Bangladesh, a major effort by NGOs like Grameen Bank and
BRAC resulted in innovative approaches like microcredit, cottage indus-
try promotion, and microenterprise.236 However, over the last thirty years,
none of these innovations have achieved the kinds of poverty reduction
needed.237 Women, who have been a major target group for these pro-
grams, remain the most economically deprived and vulnerable actors in
society.238 Moreover, liberalization of markets in developing countries
has led to the erosion of social policies that were aimed at redistribu-
231. See infra notes 271-283 and accompanying text.
232. See infra Part IV.C.
233. See Stephen, supra note 228; see also Moses Seenarine, Dalit Women: Victims or
Beneficiaries of Affirmative Action in India-A Case Study, Presentation at the Southern
Asian Institute, Columbia University (Apr. 10, 1996), available at http://www.womenutc.coml
00_09 08.htm (positing that affirmative action programs directed at dalits and other disad-
vantaged groups have not helped dalit women).
234. See SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 163, at 190-203.
235. See generally Millennium Development Goals Indicators, UNITED NATIONS [here-
inafter MDGI], available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 25,
2010).
236. See GRAMEE.N BANK, http:/lwww.grameen-info.org/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2010);
BRAC, http://www.brac.net/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
237. In the last fifteen years, the percentage of the total population that has been raised
above the poverty line ranges from 11% to -4%. See MDGI, supra note 235 (choose "Data,"
then choose "Country Level Data" from the drop down menu, then select "Goal 1," then "Tar-
get ILA," and highlight Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India in the box labeled "Countries"). Note
that not all countries have reported for the same time periods.
238. Id.; see also ISST, supra note 124, at vii-xii.
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tion.239 In the 1980s, India transitioned from an autarkic development
model to a liberalized, semi-open market.2 40 The consequence of this has
been rapid development in some sectors and steady wealth accumulation
among certain groups in the population. 24' However, the gap between
rich and poor has widened.242 Consequently, the most impoverished
women in India are the last to benefit from any growth in the economy.
At the Beijing meeting, a recurring issue brought up by women from
the Global South was the effect of fiscal policies imposed on poor na-
tions by international financial institutions.2" Specifically, structural
adjustment programs were identified as causing women to slide into
deeper poverty.245 For women from the North, the most significant issues
facing women focused on individual rights and freedoms like reproduc-
tive freedom, personal autonomy, and freedom from violence. For
instance, Azizah Al-Hibri notes the trend in international meetings where
women from the Global North determined the agenda and expected ac-
quiescence by women from the Global South. Starting in 1981, "Third
World women were told that their highest priorities related to the veil
and clitoridectomy (female genital mutilation). In Cairo, they were told
239. See Smitu Kothari, Whose Independence?: The Social Impact of Economic Reform
in India, J. INT'L AFF., Summer 1997, at 85, 95-96; see also ANDERS RIEL MULLER & RAJ
PATEL, SHINING INDIA? ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND RURAL POVERTY IN THE 1990s,
POLICY BRIEF No. 10, FOOD FIRST: INSTITUTE FOR FOOD AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 1-2
(2004).
240. Id. at 1.
241. Id. at 5-19.
242. See Graham Dwyer, Facing Asia's New Challenges, 38 ADB REVIEW,
Aug.-Oct. 2006, http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/ADBReviewl2006/vol38-3/
facing-challenges.asp.
243. See John E. Dunlop and Victoria A. Velkoff, Women and the Economy in India, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS CENTER (Dec. 3, 1998), available at http://
www.census.gov/ipc/prod/wid-9802.pdf.
244. As Corpuz states:
One of the strengths of the women's movements, especially those in the Third
World, lies in its ability to demonstrate the link between economic structures and
policies and the appalling poverty of women. Extensive research has been done by
women's organisations in Asia, Africa and Latin America on how external debt and
structural adjustment policies have intensified women's poverty. During the NGO
Forum on Huairou and in the official conference, many meetings were held on these
very issues. UNIFEM was one of the few UN agencies that organised roundtable
discussions on the effects of economic restructuring on women. But Northern gov-
ernments did not pay much attention. The World Bank on its part aggressively tried
to counter such positions through its own workshops and spokespersons.
Victoria Tauli Corpuz, Depoliticising Gender in Beijing, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, http://
www.twnside.org.sg/title/gen-ch.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010)
245. Michel Chossudovsky, The World Bank Derogates Women's Rights: Outcomes from
Beijing, 6 DEV. IN PRAC. 65, 66 (1996).
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that their highest priorities related to contraception and abortion."' The
1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna was no different
and equally disappointing. Indeed, at the concurrent NGO Forum, the
"gulf became so wide that a series of Third World women's meetings
were held impromptu on site."247 Clearly, these meetings did not give
voice to the local woman or her alternative view of the feminist subject.
The Beijing Conference would have presented another opportunity
for women human rights advocates and activists to bridge the seeming
gulf between the Global North and South. However, according to Van-
dana Shiva, this opportunity was missed.248 Similar to prior conferences,
the NGO conference at the meeting focused on a limited set of human
rights. Shiva, who is a well-known environmental activist, is scathing in
her criticism:
Human rights emerged as a major theme at the Women's Con-
ference, with speaker after speaker insisting that women's rights
are inseparable from human rights....
The right to meet basic needs does not figure in the US dis-
course on human rights even though in the Third World, the
denial of basic needs is the real issue of violation of human
rights. This will also increasingly become the central human
right that will be violated in the North as globalisation leaves
larger numbers unemployed, homeless and without economic
security.
The Beijing conference provided an opportunity to widen our
thinking about human rights to include issues of economic jus-
tice....
The narrow notion of human rights that distorted the Beijing
agenda was also exemplified in the manner in which women's
health rights have been reduced to reproductive rights, and re-
productive rights have then been distorted to imply population
control2 9
The NGO statements from Third World organizations include issues
of women's reproductive rights and violence.2 o Yet, these are not the
246. al-Hibri, supra note 180.
247. Id.
248. Vandana Shiva, Beijing Conference: Gender Justice and Global Apartheid, THIRD
WORLD NETWORK (Sept.-Oct. 1995), http://www.twnside.org.sg/ftile/just-cn.htm.
249. Id.
250. See generally Statements by NGOs, Fourth World Conference on Women, DIV. FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (Sept. 4-15, 1995), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
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central concerns expressed. Instead, economic issues affecting women as
workers, labor rights, international financial policies such as structural
adjustment, and corporate exploitation are repeatedly brought to focus as
they all impact women disparately.251
Liberal legal feminism, because of its close kinship with Liberal
thought in general, is less troubled by the neoliberal economic policies
promoted in the Global South.252 One of the keystones of neoliberal
21thought is the protection of private property. Perhaps because of this
and because of the vestigial feudalism of South Asia, one of the main
programs that India embarked upon after independence-land reform-
was never carried through to any great effect.254 The poor remain largely
landless.255 Studies show that women who own property are less vulner-
able to domestic violence.256 Yet, feminist legal activism to secure more
property for women has been mostly restricted to microenterprise, ensur-
ing that women either receive their marital property such as jewelry,
money or other moveable goods, or to changes in inheritance laws that
257limit the amount a woman can inherit from her father or her spouse.
NGOs working with microcredit and microenterprise have helped to
alleviate some of the worst effects of poverty for some women. How-
ever, there have been some criticisms of this approach, in particular,
the economic victimization by men of poor women who can more eas-
ily receive microloans.258 Moreover, without property, such enterprise is
beijing/ngostatements.html (focusing on statements made by Ms. Shum Yun Shan, Ms. Su-
patra Masdit, Dr. A. Sabah, Mrs. Shobhana Ranada, & Dr. Margaret Ogola).
251. Id.
252. See Vasuki Nesiah, Toward a Feminist Internationality: A Critique of U.S. Feminist
Legal Scholarship, in GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER 42,
42-43, 49-50 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2000) (problematizing the lack of critique of glob-
al economic forces that act upon Third World women).
253. Id.; see also PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NEOLIBERALISM: CULTURAL DEMANDS AND
LEGAL ACTIONS (Wayne V. McIntosh & Laura J. Hatcher eds., 2010). For an interesting dis-
cussion of liberal theory's shortcomings as a means of redressing social inequality, see Maria
Grahn-Farley, Race and Class: More than a Liberal Paradox, 56 BUFF. L. REv. 935, 936-38
(2008). Although I am not convinced that the welfare framework that is presented as a way to
escape liberalism's tendency to fall into dichotomies markedly differs from Liberal notions of
equality, Grahn-Farley does diagnose Liberalism's incapacity to account for permanent ine-
quality.
254. See Prem Chowdhry, Introduction: Understanding Land Rights of Women, in GEN-
DER DISCRIMINATION IN LAND OWNERSHIP, XVii-xviii (Prem Chowdhry ed., 2009); see also
A. BALAKRISHNAN, RURAL LANDLESS WOMEN LABOURERS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
(2005).
255. See BALAKRISHNAN, supra note 254.
256. See ISST, supra note 124, at 33 (discussing land ownership as being protective
against domestic violence towards women).
257. ERIN P. MOORE, GENDER, LAW, AND RESISTANCE IN INDIA 41 (1998) (finding that
upper-class women were more able to control some of their wealth).
258. Anne Marie Goetz & Rina Sen Gupta, Who Takes the Credit?: Gender, Power, and
Control Over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh, 24 WORLD DEv. 45, 45, 49
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still vulnerable to economic shifts that can dry up consumer demand.259
Little has been done to hold the state accountable for the redistribution
of land to women, and without active intervention from the state, it is
unlikely that women who are landless will ever be able to own such
property.26 For transnational activists and feminist legal scholars, the
challenge is to incorporate economic redistribution-including land re-
form that cuts against liberal property rights-in the reform agenda.
Moreover, it is critical that the global economic power structure that per-
petuates Third World indebtedness be included in reform agendas.
Further, an ancillary but increasingly important concern is the prop-
osition that it is necessary to have a shift in feminist thinking about
women as economic actors. In the South Asian contexts, women have
been a focus of development because it is recognized that helping wom-
en helps families and dependent children.26' What would a shift away
from such a communal framework do economically? Liberalism tends to
elevate the individual as the economic actor and unit of analysis above
communal actors-with the exception of the "state."262 One possible re-
sult of seeing women as autonomous actors is that they also become
better consumers for goods that may not otherwise appeal to them or
seem like a priority. Both men and women who are primarily responsible
for families and supporting the elderly in the absence of any social secu-
rity are less likely to become the consumer who purchases luxury
goods.263 Indeed, for them, the very category of luxury goods likely in-
cludes many items Western consumers consider necessities. Liberal
(1996); see John de Wit, Targeting the Poorest and Covering Costs, NEWSL. OF THE MICRO-
CREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN, Feb.-Mar. 1998, http://www.microcreditsummit.org/newsletter/
best3.htm; Celia R. Taylor, Microcredit as Model: A Critique of StateINGO Relations, 29
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 303, 327 (2002).
259. See RENANA JHABVALA & SHALINI SINHA, SELF EMPLOYED WOMEN'S ASSOCIA-
TION, LIBERALIZATION AND THE WOMAN WORKER 2-3 (2002) (discussing loss of employment
due to globalization without any efforts to retrain women in the informal economy).
260. See EKTA PARISHAD & PRAXIS-INSTITUTE FOR PARTICIPATORY PRACTICES, LAND-
LESSNESS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF DISPARITIES IN LAND DISTRIBUTION
AND PROSPECTS OF LAND REFORMS 31 (2009), http://www.angoc.org/portal/publications/
EP%20Praxis%20-%20Landless%20and%2OSocial%20Justice.pdf; see also BALAKRISHNAN,
supra note 254.
261. See MOORE, supra note 257, at 157.
262. See SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 163, at 74.
If the object is to concentrate on the individuaPs real opportunity to pursue her ob-
jectives... , then account would have to be taken not only of the primary goods the
persons respectively hold, but also of the relevant personal characteristics that gov-
ern the conversion of primary goods into the person's ability to promote her ends.
263. See CHRISTA WICHTERICH, THE GLOBALIZED WOMAN: REPORTS FROM A FUTURE
OF INEQUALITY 130 (2000); SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: ESSAYS
ON THE NEW MOBILITY OF PEOPLE AND MONEY 79-80 (1999).
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feminist legal theory should reconsider the ways in which legal reform,
in effect, delinks women from their group identities and affiliations and
works to produce not only the autonomous, free person but also individ-
ual consumers who then comprise a new and important economic
market.
B. Security: War and Environment
Feminists who have raised the seeming "irony" of humanitarian in-
tervention on behalf of ethnic populations while failing to provide such
intervention on behalf of women assume that women are a distinct group
on whose behalf such intervention would work.264 But this position ex-
hibits a sort of deep racism about non-Liberal cultures that is integral to
much of Liberalism. As Gayatri Spivak noted in her seminal work, this
racism reflects the desire to save brown women from brown men and
their oppressive cultures and religions.265 These stereotypes allow the
justification of violence against "brown men." Further they permit Lib-
eral feminists to ignore the victimization of those same "brown men" in
"traditional" societies, constructing them only as perpetrators of oppres-
266
sion against women. For example, in India, the "plight" of Muslim
women has often been used to chastise Muslim males and to denigrate
Islam as a sexist religion. 67 Muslim women have been caught between
the desire to improve their situation in society and loyalty to their own
communities. Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, for many Muslim
women to side with "outsiders" who pass judgment on an important part
of their identity and who might also call for the persecution of Muslim
men. Unfortunately, the reaction to such pressure from the outside can
be a closer hewing to rigid, conservative, and formalistic interpretations
of religion and culture.26 8
In the United States, critiques of the harmful effects of domestic vio-
269lence law reform have begun to emerge. Yet many Liberal feminists who
pushed for these reforms have largely ignored the relevance of this critique
in the global arena or in local contexts in the South. If impoverished
264. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN?: AND OTHER INTERNA-
TIONAL DIALOGUES 192-195, 276 (2006) (discussing ways in which humanitarian laws could
account for violence done to women).
265. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 296 (Carly Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988); see also
Cyra Akila Choudhury, Globalizing the Margins: Legal Exiles in the War on Terror and Lib-
eral Feminism's War for Muslim Women, 9 INT'L REV. OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 241 (2009).
266. See Spivak, supra note 265, at 296.
267. Id.; see generally RAZACK, supra note 169.
268. See Chowdhry, supra note 224, at 98 (discussing Muslim women's activism in
India).
269. See supra notes 39-61 and accompanying text.
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women in an industrialized nation like the United States are driven into
greater poverty through the criminal prosecution of their partners, is that
not likely to be even more of a concern in a country with inadequate so-
cial safety programs? In India, women's rights activists' unalloyed faith
in state intervention and legal reform as the means to improving
women's lives is questionable given that the state itself has been the per-
petrator of forced sterilization programs and other coercive regulatory
policies against women.270
In addition to the domestic sphere, the issue of international conflict
and the insecurity it causes has increasingly impacted women. Feminist
human rights proponents have not given adequate attention to the effects
of military intervention on women in the Global South. While there have
been protests against the oppression of women by men in the Global
South, the insecurity created by Western interventions has received less
criticism. For instance, the region has already suffered large internal dis-
placements in the War on Terror. In India, terror attacks from neighbors
increase the regulation and insecurity of Indian Muslim women. In Paki-
stan, drone attacks consistently kill large numbers of civilians and have
displaced millions.27' Yet these tactics that are a part of a U.S.-led War on
Terror have received less criticism for causing women's poverty and vul-
nerability than have the actions of groups like the Taliban or other
272Islamic extremists.
The gendered effects of the war are still being examined by both
Liberal feminists and other groups of feminists. For some Liberal femi-
nists, support for the War on Terror seems to pose little conflict with
their support for women's rights. This is because the men that are pur-
portedly being captured in the War on Terror are "dangerous" and
oppressive toward women. 273 However, this convenient fiction that only
the guilty are being captured is becoming harder to maintain as the
United States fails to bring charges against many captives and with the
270. See MOORE, supra note 257, at 60-62.
271. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Pakistan Drone War Takes a Toll on Mili-
tants-and Civilians, CNN (Oct. 29, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/OPINION/10/29/
bergen.drone.war/ (claiming one in four people killed in a drone attack is a civilian); see also
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN: A REPORT FROM THE
FIELD, THE BROOKINGS Institution (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
events/2010/0505_idps.aspx (noting that in a two-week period two million Pakistanis were
displaced and 1.4 million remain displaced as of May 2010).
272. See Work Towards Freedom and Equality: For the Women of Afghanistan,
WOMEN FOR WOMEN INTERNATIONAL, http://www.womenforwomen.org/global-initiatives-
helping-women/help-women-afghanistan.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2010); WOMEN FOR
AFGHAN WOMEN, http://www.womenforafghanwomen.org/advocacy.php?ID=advocacy/
oct_2009.html (last updated Oct. 2009); FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUNDATION, http://
feminist.org/afghan/taliban-women.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
273. See Choudhury, supra note 265, at 4.
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revelation of stories like that of Maher Arar and other innocent men cap-
274tured in the sweeps. Women are made less secure when the men in
their society are subject to scrutiny and pursuit as terrorist suspects
based only on their identity rather than their actions. In places like Af-
ghanistan, the loss of male family members can result in severe hardship
for women who have no recourse to state security. 75 Several questions
arise. First, to what extent are feminism's aims compatible with govern-
mental police and military power? Second, how can a genuine liberation
theory like feminism support efforts against terrorism without buying
into the stereotypes of the "bad" brown man and the helpless brown
woman?
The value of feminist criticism is that it highlights the many ways in
which dominant power structures and distributions disadvantage wom-
en.276 But when such criticism comes from the North and colludes with
global power-holders, like the U.S. government, it loses some of its le-
gitimacy.27 7 While the particular partnership of Liberal legal feminism
and state power on behalf of women might seem innocuous, it is impor-
tant to remember that after September 11, the issue of women's
oppression was employed as a rallying cry by the administration in its
effort to justify military intervention in Afghanistan.278 Sadly, the coopta-
tion of women's rights found little resistance among Liberal feminists.279
Finally, in order to make feminist legal activism and theory truly
valuable for women in the Global South, the idea of "human rights" en-
visioned narrowly as a number of individual rights ought to be
reconsidered. The orthodox categories of human rights as those limited
to the Liberal political and legal articulations can obscure the denial of
other human requirements. One of these requirements is environmental
security. Women in the Global South have long understood the interde-
pendent nature of their society and the environment.280 The material
274. See Cyra Akila Choudhury, Terrorists & Muslims: The Construction, Performance,
and Regulation of Muslim Identities in the Post 9/11 United States, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIG-
ION 8, 40 (2006).
275. See Afghan Widows in the Fetters of the Fundamentalism, REVOLUTIONARY Asso-
CIATION OF THE WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN (RAWA) (Dec. 13, 1996), http://www.rawa.org/
widows.html.
276. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An
Agenda for Theory 7 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 515, 516 (1982).
277. See generally Choudhury, supra note 82.
278. Vasuki Nesiah, From Berlin to Bonn to Baghdad: A Space for Infinite Justice, 17
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 75, 90-91 (2004).
279. Id. at 157.
280. For example, South Asian women were involved in environmental activism as early
as the 1970s. See CHIPKO MOVEMENT, INDIA, http://www.iisd.org/50comm/commdb/
desc/d07.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) (describing the movement that began when village
women worked to save trees from illegal logging in North India); NARMADA BACHAO
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consumption of resources by the North has a direct effect on people in
the South. The North, which produces most of the greenhouse gases re-
sponsible for climate change suffers fewer of its impacts. 28' Rather it is
mostly the poverty-stricken people of the Global South and occasionally
the poor in the North who consume far fewer resources and who struggle
against environmental degradation such as floods, droughts, and food
and shelter insecurity while clinging to the bare threads of life.282 Liberal
notions of human rights fail to take these military and environmental
factors into consideration, thereby absolving Liberal feminists of their
complicity in the global distribution and consumption of resources as
well as the distribution of consequences.283 Without accountability for
such complicity, the orotund pieties mouthed about "women's rights"
being "human rights" ring hollow.
C. Culture and Religion: Provincializing Liberal Legal Feminism
The final reorientation that would make Liberal legal feminism an
equal partner in reform is a change in the relationship between feminist
theory and what it externalizes as culture or religion. During the colonial
era, culture and tradition were considered the leg-irons that held the sub-
continent back.2 8 Progress demanded that the regressive elements of
Indian culture be reformed to comport with the Liberal notions of a just
ANDOLAN, http://www.ecoindia.comleducation/narmada-bachao-andolan.htm (last visited
Sept. 20, 2010) (describing the efforts of Indian woman working to prevent the damming of
the Narmada river).
281. See Global Inequities, WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, http://www.worldwatch.org/
node/810#3 (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) ("While the consumer class thrives, great disparities
remain. The 12 percent of the world's population that lives in North America and Western
Europe accounts for 60 percent of private consumption spending, while the one-third living in
South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa accounts for only 3.2 percent."); see also JEREMY I. LE-
VITT & MATTHEW C. WHITTAKER, HURRICANE KATRINA: AMERICA'S UNNATURAL DISASTER
(2009) (examining the impact of Hurricane Katrina on poor populations in New Orleans, ar-
guably, the worst natural disaster to strike the U.S.); Katrina and Global Warming, PEW
CENTER ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/specialreportskatrina.cfm (last
visited Oct. 25, 2010) (while it is uncertain that Katrina was caused by global warming, there
is some support for this theory); Deborah Zabarenko, U.S. Blacks Face Harsher Climate
Change Impact, REUTERS, Jul. 29, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article
/idUSN2933881420080729?feedType=RSS&feedName=environmentNews (discussing the
effects of climate change on poor blacks).
282. See U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rts., The Relationship Between Climate Change
and Human Rights, 10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009); See also Women, Gender
Equality and Climate Change, U.N. WOMEN WATCH, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature
climatechange/#threat (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
283. See Chandra Talpade Mohanty, US Empire and the Project of Women's Studies:
Stories of Citizenship, Complicity and Dissent, 13 GENDER, PLACE & CULTURE: J. FEMINIST
GEOGRAPHY 7, 15-18 (2006).
284. See MEHTA, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
314 [Vol. 32:259
Globalizing Family Law Progress
and good society.285 Liberal legal feminism retains this dynamic in its
relationship with culture and tradition which have become its "other."
That is to say, Liberal legal feminism imagines itself as an equal oppor-
286
tunity critic of culture wherever that culture subordinates women.
However, this position hides the cultural valence of Liberal legal femi-
nism itself, making it the norm against which all other cultures must
inevitably fail. Some women in South Asia resist the idea that culture
and religion are primarily to blame for their subordination.28 7 Muslim
women, for instance, are reluctant to read Islam as irredeemably unjust
toward women.288 They hold out hope that there can be changes within
the religion while also maintaining that adherence to Islam is integral to
notions of good society and the good life. Liberal critiques that recall the
colonial paternalism toward subject populations cannot be liberating if
those who it seeks to free are belittled by it.
This sort of denigrating Liberal feminist thought is evident in the
late Susan Moller Okin's work. In her contribution to the anthology, De-
centering the Center: Philosophy for a Multicultural, Postcolonial
World, Okin decidedly stakes herself at the center of a Liberal worldview
that is in opposition to the marginal positions that the book purports to
289theorize. In the litany of abuses against women, her gaze is unidirec-
tionally aimed at the concerns of the Global South. From Pakistan to
Mali and from arranged marriages to female genital "mutilation," her
subjects are rarely women in the center.290
The normative claims that Okin makes, cloaked in objectivity, are
that these women are so abjectly oppressed that the international wom-
en's rights movement must be more responsive and answer their cries.291
She supports her position by relying on the narratives of women in the
third world who have documented these abuses for themselves. These
narratives can, therefore, be cited by Western, elite feminists as evidence
of oppression without the necessary contextualization. Indeed the con-
textualization, if and when offered by Third World women, is often
(mis)characterized as apology and dismissed.292
Dismissing the contexts and glossing over the anxiety that Third
World women face when they report subordination allows dominant
285. Id.
286. See Choudhury, supra note 82, at 156-59.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 160.
289. See generally Susan Moller Okin, Feminism, Women's Human Rights, and Cultural
Differences, in DECENTERING THE CENTER: PHILOSOPHY FOR A MULTICULTURAL, POSTCOLO-
NIAL, AND FEMINIST WORLD 26 (Uma Narayan & Sandra Harding eds., 2000).
290. Id. at 28-32.
291. Id. at 42.
292. See id. at 37 (detailing Okin's discussion of Mohanty).
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Western feminists of all backgrounds to call for simple solutions like the
"universal" application of "human rights."293 It prevents them from hav-
ing to grapple with prior histories and experiences of colonization and
domination and to come to terms with their own power that is often ex-
erted over other women.294 In short, it makes facile claims to sisterhood
while rendering that possibility rather more difficult for Third World
women.
One result of this resistance to contextualize different women's ex-
periences is that Liberal judgments labeling certain cultures as
"oppressive" can be rendered without explaining or justifying the author-
ity of the judge to make such pronouncements in the first instance. 295
Again, Okin provides an example of precisely this kind of ahistorically
decontextualized judgment:
This situation of private rights violations is exacerbated by the
fact that "respecting cultural differences" has increasingly be-
come a euphemism for restricting or denying women's human
rights.... In India, for example, partly because of the history of
violent religious intolerance, this distinction is built into the
formal framework of the state; the different religious communi-
ties enforce their own "personal laws," and there is no uniform
civil code of family law. This can have grave consequences for
women, who are differently (albeit usually unfairly) treated in
divorce, and in custody and inheritance issues, depending on
which religious group they belong to.296
Reading this paragraph, one gets the notion that Indian lawmakers
chose to enshrine religious differences and inequalities into the constitu-
tion without regard to the impact on women. Yet, nowhere is it made
evident that it was the British imperial establishment, seeking to admin-
ister a colony with greater efficiency, that codified the various religious
293. Cf Azizah Y al-Hibri, Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third
World/Minority Women?, in SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?
41 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (critiquing Okin's use of a dominant Western perspective
of cultural universality); Lama Abu-Odeh, Post-Colonial Feminism and the Veil: Considering
the Differences 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1527 (1992) (arguing that the veil can be empowering
for Arab women).
294. Janet Halley makes this argument about feminism's own will to power. See JANET
HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 20-22 (2006)
(discussing Governance feminism and its desire to govern, to "rule").
295. See Okin, supra note 289, at 36-37, for a discussion of the anti-essentialist critique
that, in her judgment, was taken to an extreme: "After reading or experiencing these critiques,
many feminists (whether First or Third World, but especially the former) might have felt more
than somewhat inhibited about writing anything, especially about Third World women, that
was not entirely contextualized and localized in its focus." Id. (emphasis added).
296. Id. at 30-31.
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laws governing people's lives, thereby fixing them in the firmament of
Indian law.297 I make this point not to absolve Indian lawmakers of their
duty to resolve the tension between equal rights for women enshrined in
the Indian Constitution and the continuation of religious law in the fam-
ily law arena, but to point out how Okin's account can obscure the role
of British imperialism in modern Indian law.298
Chandra Talpade Mohanty's critique of such decontextualization and
the overly simplistic idea of "global sisterhood" 29 are rejected. Instead,
Okin brushes it off and vigorously defends the right of "white Western,
middle-class, feminists" to offer up their judgments based on simply the
observation that "we recognize each other."3a Indeed, given the colonial
history of much of the world, it is ironic that at any hint of deconstruc-
tion, such misrecognition and the right to judgment are defended with
alacrity:
It seems that some of the best feminist social critics are "inside-
outside critics"; that is, persons from within a culture who at
some point in life have experiences outside of that culture that
makes them critical of some of its practices.... But though
these women are all undoubtedly, in a sense, particularly in-
formed and effective as "inside-outside critics" being a critic so
located is surely neither necessary nor sufficient for being an in-
311formed and effective feminist critic.
Okin is correct to point out that personal experience of a culture
alone, without a feminist theory, is insufficient to make a good "feminist
critic," yet, complete inexperience of a people's history and only a
Liberal feminist theory rooted in the values and judgments of "Western"
epistemological cultures ought not to be "sufficient" qualifications
297. See Choudhury, supra note 224, at 52-59.
298. It is also important to interrogate more closely whether advancing a universal, uni-
form civil code would indeed alleviate the oppression of women at the hands of unequal (and,
and therefore, unfair) religious law. Here Okin makes a simplistic judgment that such a code is
"better" based her own values that may not easily translate to a heterogenous and conflict-
ridden society like India. See Okin, supra note 289, at 31. 1 have argued that the Uniform Civil
Code, in the hands of a Hindu fundamentalist political party, driven by a fundamentalist ideol-
ogy, is an instrument of assimilation and punishment of minority communities. It is, in a word,
Hindu fundamentalist men saving Muslim, Christian, Parsi, and Jewish women from their
men. See Choudhury, supra note 224, at 78-79. Yet, Okin, who is content to skim the surface
in her desire to cover the far geographies of women's oppression, does not even offer a cita-
tion to clarify this point.
299. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Feminist Encounters: Locating the Politics of Experi-
ence, in DESTABILIZING THEORY: CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST DEBATEs 77-79 (Michele Barrett
& Anne Phillips eds., 1992).
300. See Okin, supra note 289, at 37.
301. Id. at 40.
317Winter 2011]1
Michigan Journal of International Law
either.30 2 Progress is not an explicit element of Okin's critique of
"culture," but it is clear that cultural practices that do not measure up to
her ideal of "equality," that do not guarantee women's human rights, and
that continue to countenance if not promote inequality are "backward."303
One certainly gets the idea that we are moving away from culture and
toward civilization, or ought to be.
Like Okin, Catherine MacKinnon has expressed skepticism about
the anti-essentialism critique that is aimed at making "sisterhood" more
problematic.3 Until recently, MacKinnon had confined her work to
North America; however, her recent book, Are Women Human and Other
International Dialogues, seeks to extend her work further afield.303
MacKinnon does not take up the cultural critique but rather simply con-
siders all women as equally placed when it comes to violence and
subordination at the hands of men.306 While she acknowledges that there
are men who are also subordinated, her lack of attention to the difference
between men and women in some countries or societies compared to
their counterparts of different ethnicities, religions, or races renders ob-
scure the roles that these latter play in subordination in general.3o,
MacKinnon disaggregates gendered violence from all other kinds of vio-
lence in a way that makes it hard to see how other violence can
exacerbate gender violence. Moreover, it hides some women's support of
violence. For instance, Hindu fundamentalist women have been shown to
encourage their male counterparts to commit violence against Muslim
men and women in India.os Many women in the United States have been
supporters of the wars on Terror and in Iraq, which have visited devastat-
ing violence on Iraqi women, insofar as they were willing to support the
pro-war political Bush establishment by returning it to power in 2004.30
Historically, middle-class white women have supported slavery, colonial-
ism, and other forms of violence that have subordinated both women and
302. Id.
303. Id. at 35.
304. See MAcKINNON, supra note 264, at 50-52.
305. See id. at ix-xvii.
306. Id. at 53-54, 130.
307. For instance, she discusses the rapes of women in Bosnia in great detail but does
not tie them sufficiently to the ethnic cleansing of their men. While the rape of Bosnian wom-
en was a grotesque campaign, surely the death of their men was as horrific if not worse. See,
e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 264, at 141-233.
308. See Choudhury, supra note 224, at 84.
309. See News Release, Institute for Women's Policy Research, Smaller Gender Gap in
Crucial States May Have Cost Kerry the Election (Nov. 11, 2004), available at
http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/IWPR-Release-l1-11-04.pdf (while women voted in larger numbers
for John Kerry overall, the small increase in support for Bush among women may have been
enough to return him to power); see generally supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Feminist Majority Foundation). Cf Choudhury, supra note 82.
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men of color.1 o Women in Arab countries have countenanced the abuse
of domestic servants from South Asia who are mostly women."' While
MacKinnon's work is of great value in highlighting the gendered vio-
lence that takes place in all societies, the recognition that for some
women, gendered, class-based, and racial violence intersect and can be
perpetrated by women as well as men. Like Okin, MacKinnon enables
herself to speak about all women's experience as though there were a
seamless experience accessible to all who share a biological trait. Inter-
estingly, MacKinnon disavows this characterization of her theory and of
feminist theory as well. She contends that feminism as theorized by the
Second Wave is a theory born of the particularities of women's lives and
is ground-up theory. That is, feminist theory is based on women's ex-
perience; it is not a metanarrative or a totalizing theory that seeks to
explain all of women's experiences through the monocausal use of gen-
der.3 12 Yet, it is far from clear that MacKinnon's theory accounts for
differences at the intersection of a number of oppressions, including
those visited upon some women by other women. Certainly, in her recent
essays Are Women Human, the general is more obvious than the particu-
lar.
In this work, MacKinnon has urged us to rethink women's relation-
ship to international law.' In particular, she underscores the irony of
leaving unexamined the daily, "ordinary" violence that is committed by
men on women in every culture and country during peacetime while
scrutinizing the acute moments of violence that are experienced during
war. Moreover, she emphasizes the fact that international law is patriar-
314
chal and male dominated. The states on which it relies are equally so
and the concept of sovereignty shields states and the men in them from
the gaze of international law when it comes to women's rights violations.
The result is that women have not been able to fully vindicate their rights
as humans under international legal norms and instruments.315
To progress toward greater women's rights, in MacKinnon's view,
the legal doctrine of state sovereignty that shields violators from being
310. See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN?: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1999)
(critiquing the subordination of black women at the hands of black men and white women).
311. See INT'L LABOR ORG., GENDER & MIGRATION IN ARAB STATES: THE CASE OF
DOMESTIC WORKERS (Simel Esim & Monica Smith eds., 2004), available at http://
www.gender.gcim.org/attachements/Book%20in%20ArabStates.pdf; Trapped in the Home:
Global Trafficking and Exploitation of Migrant Domestic Workers, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/trapped-home-global-trafficking-and-
exploitation-migrant-domestic-workers (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
312. See MAcKINNON, supra note 264, at 45-50.
313. Id. at 259-78.
314. Id. at 277.
315. Id. at 266-67.
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held accountable by the international community ought to be curtailed or
abandoned altogether.' Further, strengthening international legal norms
that protect women would also give women the means to vindicate their
rights. While MacKinnon argues on one hand that feminists were among
the first to give the lie of the "universality" of norms that were patriar-
chal in origin and effect, this critique collapses or is ignored when it
comes to cultural or political universalism." International law's univers-
alism is left untouched and is, indeed, promoted as a means by which
women's rights can be better protected. I am not arguing here about
whether this is a true claim, but rather that she is willing to argue for
particularity when it comes to women's experiences but not when it
comes to cultural-societal experiences. Instead, we are left with a sense
that there is a utopia where all women are treated equally with men and
that equality and the contents of the society in which they live will be
determined by the norms of international law-a Western, Liberal ar-
rangement by description."'
To restate many other theorists, Okin and MacKinnon may have
been concerned with women as a group, but the rights in international
law which they rightly argue are due women are individual rights. They
accrue to a woman as a singular political individual and must be exer-
cised as such. Moreover, in their view, such rights ought not to be
subordinated to other categories of rights or obligations-particularly
those that might stem from their cultural or religious identities.319 Why is
316. Id. at 190-91.
317. Id. at 53-54.
318. This is not to say that international law can only be a Western, Liberal arrangement.
It merely notes that the current dominant strains of international law are clearly of this West-
ern, Liberal persuasion. Moreover, a number of critiques have been made with regard to the
way in which the dominant receives the subordinate in International law and how this interac-
tion shapes and changes international legal norms. See, e.g., David Kennedy, When Renewal
Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 335 (2000) (discussing new
approaches to international law and the emergence of critical strains of thought in interna-
tional legal theory).
319. Let me take this opportunity to make a distinction between my argument for culture
and "identitarian" arguments for culture. My argument for culture rests not on any desire to
protect or enshrine one particular reading of culture or religion in the world in a fixed, essen-
tialist way. I am not privileging my understanding, or a "traditional" understanding of Islam,
or South Asian cultures, which are at once intertwined yet distinct. Rather, I argue that alterna-
tive cultures in all their multiplicity are threatened by the Liberal notion of progress in so far
as that progress is tied to a particular view of rights and relationships whose content is deter-
mined by historically and geographically contingent norms. I argue that such cultures, along
with the religions that they may contain, have value despite the Liberal judgment that they are
"regressive," a judgment that is often based on narrow understandings and experiences of
"others" and a set of veiled preferences about social ordering. Furthermore, I imagine different
cultures to hold out the possibilities of different visions of human flourishing including differ-
ent forms of practicing a religion. As such, I value the pluralism that it may offer even while
understanding that "choice" in connection to culture may be illusory at best. As a comparatist,
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this so? It is because those identities are also the source of subordination
and have shielded the unequal ways in which women have been
treated. 320 It is here that the Liberal judgments about alien cultures and
the teleology of progress toward a Liberal state, culture, political, and
legal arrangement become apparent.321 Whereas, imperial Liberals de-
sired such an end in order to arrive at a stage in history where the
colonies would be fully able to govern themselves, Liberal feminists
wished for this progress in order for women to be fully individualized
agency-wielding "humans."322
The critique of "Imperial" Liberal legal feminism does not deny that
culture constrains and some cultural practices subordinate.323 The ques-
tion is to what extent should feminists call for the reform of those
practices as part of a human rights agenda? If women's rights advocates
in the Global North continue to locate oppression in cultural and reli-
gious practices, they will continue to alienate many women in the Global
South.
CONCLUSION: JUSTICE AND PROGRESS FOR WOMEN
In an era of increasing globalization, borders have become porous,
lives interconnected and now more than ever the local is global. Theoriz-
ing these connections has been a challenge for feminist theorists seeking
to improve the lives of women. This Article has attempted to draw some
linkages in this effort. The first linkage is between U.S. domestic dis-
courses and advocacy for women's rights and its constitutive effect on
international and transnational theory and activism. Focusing on the le-
gal battles for abortion and domestic violence, it has tried to show how
these local U.S. concerns are elevated as universal concerns for all
women and thus overshadow the priorities of poor women in the South.
Part of the export of these ideas is the export of the feminist subject that
is constructed in the elite "women's rights are human rights" discourse.
Also, linking the Liberal feminist subject to the transnational feminist sub-
ject underscores the continuity between these two constructs. Indeed, this
continuity is hardly surprising given that the elites engaged in human
rights activism at this level share theoretical roots in Liberal ideas of
progress.
constrained by my own hybrid culture, I, nevertheless, look to other cultures for such alterna-
tive realities to an increasingly enveloping Liberal, secular universal reality.
320. See MACKINNON, supra note 264, at 53-54.
321. See Okin, supra note 289.
322. See MEHTA, supra note 7.
323. See Janet Halley, Culture Constrains, in SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS MULTICULTUR-
ALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 100, 100-04 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
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The second linkage that the Article attempts to highlight is the role of
transnational Liberal legal feminism and reform agendas in the local South
Asian context. The argument here is that transnational elites bring home
understandings of women's rights that are heavily influenced by Liberal
feminist thought. As such, their reforms reflect these understandings of
women's autonomy and liberation. However, the transnational-liberal fe-
minist subject is challenged by the reality of the local woman who remains
embedded in society and family living, a far more communal existence
than Liberalism acknowledges. Consequently, the representatives of im-
poverished women in the South articulate a different set of priorities than
those of their transnational and Northern counterparts. While there is
significant overlap in priorities-domestic violence and reproductive
health are important issues in the Global South-economic justice and
redistribution, global financial disparities, and insecurity caused by po-
lice and military intervention are more important priorities. Perhaps most
disconcerting to transnational and Northern women is the unwillingness
of many "traditional" women to jettison their attachments to culture and
religion.
Finally, the Article has argued that in order to live up to its liberating
potential, Liberal legal feminism ought to re-orient itself. Part of that
process is to dismantle ideas of progress that include racist and neo-
imperial judgments about the backwardness of "traditional" women and
take their perspective and priorities seriously. Legal and political reforms
undertaken, then, ought to be in partnership and with sensitivity to what
local women need and desire. Their articulations of human flourishing
-rather than the assumptions of elite women-need to be given their
full weight. For instance, reducing the right to health care to maternal
care and reproductive rights reinforces the gender stereotypical treatment
of women as nothing but walking wombs. The governments of all three
subcontinental countries' population-control programs have done this at
the expense of other health needs. Moreover, abortion access has led to
sex-selective abortions, reducing the number of women being born.
Abortion as a legal right is less of an issue than the neglect and infanti-
cide of girl children that has skewed sex ratios and led to the trafficking
of women to meet the demand in the marriage market. Without taking
these issues into consideration, activism for global abortion rights could
be considered willfully one-sided.
Ultimately, the position I take is not one that questions the legiti-
macy of outsider critique or transnational legal activism for women. Re-
orienting feminism does not prevent critique, disagreement, or action.
Rather, it requires that disagreement and critique come from a position
of equality and humility rather than superiority and condescension.
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Transnational collaborations must make space for subaltern agents to
speak and act. If they do not, they risk disempowering poor women fur-
ther and failing to reach the potential of feminist transnational advocacy.
APPENDIX
TABLE 1
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
RELATING TO WOMEN
General Provisions/Human For Reproductive Against Domestic
Rights/Equal Protection Rights/Family Rights Violence/Violence
UN Preamble
Charter"" Article 1
UDHR.s The declaration in its entirety Article 16 Article 3is written in gender neutral Article 25 Article 4
language and applies to Article 5
"everyone." Article 6
Article 7
Article 8
Article 12
Article 28
ICCPR36  Article 2 Article 23 Article 6Article 3 Article 24 Article 7
Article 6 Article 8
Article 14 Article 9
Article 16 Article 26
Article 17
ICESCR.. Preamble Article 10
Article 3 Article 12
Article 7
CEDAW3a The Convention is generally Article 5 Article 6 (trafficking and
applicable to all minorities. Article 10 prostitution)
Equal protection and equal Article 11
treatment is a recurring Article 12
obligation throughout the Article 13
document. Article 14
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
U.N. Charter, pmbl., art. 1.
See UDHR, supra note 96.
See ICCPR, supra note 97.
See ICESCR, supra note 98.
See CEDAW, supra note 99.
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329. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter CAT], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm.
330. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinaf-
ter CERD], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm.
General Provisions/Human For Reproductive Against Domestic
Rights/Equal Protection Rights/Family Rights Violence/Violence
Article 16
CAT- Preamble Applicable to State parties
CERD- The Convention is generally Article 5 Article 5
(impacting applicable to all minorities.
minority
women)
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